Statement by UK Ambassador Corinne Kitsell on behalf of Australia, the UK and the US to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors on IAEA safeguards and AUKUS
Chair,
I take the floor on behalf of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to respond to misleading claims about Australia's acquisition of a naval nuclear propulsion capability through the AUKUS partnership. We are once again compelled to invoke our Right of Reply to address remarks that purposefully mischaracterise the nature of our collaboration.
Australia's cooperation with the UK and US on this matter is being undertaken in full compliance with our respective obligations under the NPT, Treaty of Rarotonga, and Australia's safeguards agreements with the IAEA.
The repeated attempts by one member state to add this item to this meeting's agenda falsely implies an active compliance problem where none exists and continues to distract from other matters that require the Board's attention.
Chair,
Under this item, the Board continues to hear unsubstantiated claims that ignore or misrepresent information AUKUS partners have provided in good faith, and assertions that disregard the statements made by the Director General. I would like to remind the Board of five things:
First, Australia's nuclear-powered submarines will be conventionally armed. Australia does not have and will not seek to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons, nor will the UK nor the US provide any assistance, encouragement or inducement to do so.
Second, naval nuclear propulsion was foreseen by the drafters of the NPT. Article 14 of the IAEA's model Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement - on which Australia's CSA is based - is the specific provision to support the right of states to use nuclear material in a nonproscribed military activity within the legal framework for safeguards implementation, including for naval nuclear propulsion.
Third, the IAEA has the clear authority under its Statute, and extensive precedent, to negotiate directly and in-confidence with individual Member States on the establishment and application of safeguards and verification arrangements. Interference would politicise the IAEA's independence, mandate and technical authority, and establish a deeply harmful precedent.
Fourth, it is also not true that the transfer of high enriched uranium from a Nuclear-Weapon State to a Non-Nuclear-Weapon State runs counter to the NPT or its spirit. The transfer of nuclear material at any enrichment level among States Parties is not prohibited by the NPT, provided the transfer is carried out in a manner consistent with any relevant safeguards obligations. Australia's conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine programme will be subject to a robust package of verification measures consistent with its longstanding non-proliferation obligations.
Fifth, under Australia's Article 14 arrangement, the IAEA will be enabled to continue meeting its technical objectives at all stages of the submarines' lifecycle. Once the Article 14 arrangement is agreed between Australia and the IAEA Secretariat, the Director General has stated that he will transmit it to the Board for 'appropriate action'. The Board will certainly not be bypassed.
Chair,
We continue to oppose any proposal for this item to be a standing agenda item, or any efforts that undermine and politicise the independent, technical mandate of the Agency.
All three AUKUS partners continue to take seriously our commitment to openness and transparency with member states on this matter, and we will continue to engage in good faith on genuine questions.
Consistent with our approach since our partnership was announced in 2021, we will provide an update to the Board under 'Any Other Business' and welcome the Director General's continued commitment to provide updates on naval nuclear propulsion, as and when he deems appropriate.
Thank you, Chair.
