The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Mariano Grossi, has called on those countries which still have an old-style nuclear safeguards agreement to agree to stricter verification measures as part of efforts to further strengthen the global non-proliferation inspection regime.
Director General Grossi this month sent official letters to 31 countries which have a type of IAEA safeguards protocol designed in the early 1970s for States with little or no nuclear material and no nuclear material in a facility. He asked them to replace the so-called Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) to their Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) as soon as possible with a revised version introduced by the IAEA Board of Governors fifteen years ago to firm up the reporting and inspection rules, or to rescind it altogether.
"This is essential to address a weakness in the IAEA safeguards system," he told a meeting of the Board of Governors on Monday. "In 2020, the old standard SQP is simply not adequate."
Safeguards are a set of technical measures applied by the IAEA on nuclear material and activities through which it seeks to verify that there is no misuse of nuclear technology or diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses. States accept these measures through the conclusion of safeguards agreements with the IAEA.
Under the original SQP most IAEA verification activities are held in abeyance or suspended - especially those related to reporting and inspections - while the revised SQP reinstates the implementation of some safeguards requirements such as the submission of an initial report on nuclear material and the possibility of Agency inspections. In addition, it is no longer possible for a country with an existing or planned nuclear facility to have an SQP to its CSA with the IAEA, under the revised rules.
In the letter, the Director General said the IAEA safeguards system had significantly evolved in recent decades, with an increasing expectation of greater transparency and accountability.
"Safeguards implementation in States with SQPs based on the original standardized text is an area of difficulty as nuclear material declarations are not provided and the IAEA cannot implement in-field verification activities in those States," he said. "Therefore, the IAEA's ability to draw a credible and soundly based annual safeguards conclusion for those States is becoming increasingly challenging."
