Geopolitical tensions rarely stay confined to the battlefield. They ripple through global markets - particularly energy and food. The war between the US, Israel and Iran is a reminder of how quickly conflict can affect food security far beyond the region.
Author
- Lotanna Emediegwu
Senior Lecturer in Economics, Manchester Metropolitan University
One of the most consequential developments of this conflict has been the disruption of shipping through the strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway through which roughly a fifth of the world's oil and gas normally passes.
Iran has also targeted energy infrastructure in neighbouring Gulf states . Oil and gas facilities in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar have reportedly halted operations after drone attacks. Because the Middle East accounts for roughly 30% of global oil production and about 17% of natural gas production, such disruptions quickly rattled energy markets.
Higher energy prices may bring windfalls for oil-exporting countries. But they also push up the cost of producing and transporting food. That is why this conflict is likely to have consequences for food security, particularly in developing economies.
Food production depends heavily on energy. Fuel powers agricultural machinery, irrigation systems and transport networks that move food from farms to markets. Energy is also crucial for processing, refrigeration and long-distance shipping.
Fertiliser production is another key link. Nitrogen-based fertilisers rely heavily on natural gas and other energy inputs. When farmers' production costs rise, it eventually filters through into food prices.
Food prices had already begun rising in February 2026 for the first time in five months. This was driven mainly by higher cereal prices - particularly wheat - following frost risks in parts of Europe and the US. There are also continuing logistical disruptions in the Black Sea region amid the Russia-Ukraine war.
The current surge in energy prices is likely to intensify these pressures. For example, the futures price of wheat (whereby traders buy and sell wheat at a predetermined price for future delivery) in Chicago recently approached a two-year high . This came amid fears of higher transport and production costs.
Similar pressures could emerge across other staple crops if the Middle East conflict continues to disrupt energy supply.
In a 2024 study , Marco Rogna and I examined how changes in international agricultural commodity prices are transmitted to domestic markets in developing countries. The research looked at staples including maize, rice, sorghum and wheat, across countries in sub-Saharan Africa, east Asia and the Pacific, and south Asia.
Our findings show that increases in international food prices are quickly transmitted to domestic markets in many developing economies. This is largely because many of these countries depend heavily on food imports or food aid for staples they do not produce in sufficient quantities.
When global prices rise, local food prices typically begin to increase within a month. In most cases, the strongest effects occur quickly and then gradually fade within about two months. But even short-lived spikes can have serious consequences for households that spend a large share of their income on food.
Food insecurity
The degree of impact also varies by commodity. Our results suggest that wheat prices are particularly sensitive to global shocks. In some developing economies, a 1% increase in global wheat prices can lead to a local price increase of up to 1.5%.
One notable exception is sorghum. Around 80% of the land devoted to growing this grain around the world is in developing countries, particularly in parts of sub-Saharan Africa and south Asia. It is largely consumed locally as a staple that can be used for flour, for example. Because production and consumption are mostly domestic rather than tied to international trade, sorghum markets are less exposed to global volatility.
Regional differences also matter. Countries in east Asia and the Pacific are more exposed to global maize price increases because they rely more heavily on these imports. By contrast, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa are more vulnerable to fluctuations in rice prices because of their growing reliance on imports due to climate change, internal conflict and rapidly growing populations.
Political institutions can also shape how global price shocks affect local markets. Our research found that democratic developing countries often respond more quickly to rising food prices than non-democratic ones. For example, when international rice prices rise, non-democratic countries such as Afghanistan may experience roughly twice the increase in domestic rice prices as democratic nations like Nigeria.
These discrepancies could be explained by the fact that democratic governments face stronger pressure to intervene through subsidies, trade adjustments or food support programmes.
As these tensions disrupt global energy markets, governments in developing countries will need to prepare for possible food price shocks. Policies that strengthen domestic food production, particularly for locally adaptable crops such as sorghum, can reduce reliance on volatile global markets.
Governments can also draw lessons from developed economies by investing in strategic grain reserves, improving food storage and transport infrastructure, and expanding targeted welfare programmes to support vulnerable households during price spikes.
In an interconnected global economy, major conflicts rarely stay local. Households in poorer countries thousands of miles away may feel the impact not on the battlefield but at the dinner table.
Lotanna Emediegwu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
