The scale and quality of the expansion of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) military technologies and platforms represent Australia's top security priority and the largest threat to regional stability. But there is a potential disconnect between the PLA's technological capability and the less tangible organisational and human-centred elements of military power. This paper contends that Beijing's impressive ability to build and deploy new military hardware may be outpacing its ability to develop and enhance less tangible elements of military power such as leadership, training and doctrine. Xi and the Chinese Communist Party are openly critical of corruption, poor leadership, stove piped training and slow doctrine development in the PLA. These less tangible elements of military power likely weigh on Xi's mind when contemplating a potential invasion of Taiwan.
Xi has diagnosed these deficiencies as a symptom of insufficient political education and understanding of Party theory and sees the cure as more political training to ensure obedience to the Party. It means that, for Xi and the Party, political strength is the key to national power. This presents great risk but also opportunities for those seeking to deter China, with the likely creation of a military force unable to give unfettered military advice to the political leadership. For Australia and our allies and partners, building material capability to deter China is vitally important, but advantages in professional military leadership, effective joint and coalition operations and well-developed employment concepts are equally important tools of deterrence and preparation.
