Delivered to the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors meeting on June 2026
I thank the Director General for his sobering report, and for the continued professionalism and courage of IAEA staff on the ground. Their presence remains indispensable in reducing risks and providing independent, credible reporting under extraordinarily difficult conditions.
The report points to a progressively degrading operating environment across Ukraine's nuclear sites. However, developments since its issuance underscore that these risks are not static. They are worsening.
It is Russia's illegal invasion and ongoing aggression against Ukraine that has created these conditions, forcing the Agency into the role of negotiating military pauses around nuclear facilities.
Chair, we are deeply alarmed by the recent drone strike against the Centralised Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility at Chornobyl. That a strike of this nature could occur without immediate radiological consequences should not reassure us; it underlines how narrow the safety margins have become, and how dependent they now are on circumstance rather than control.
This facility sits within a vast exclusion zone, well outside any immediate military necessity. Striking nuclear infrastructure in such an environment is not coincidence - it is reckless and wilful irresponsibility.
This is reinforced by the detail of the Director General's report: persistent and widespread military activity across all of Ukraine's nuclear sites, including ZNPP; ongoing grid instability; attacks on energy infrastructure; and repeated reliance on emergency systems to compensate for those failures.
The sheer volume of incidents is striking:
One power line to Rivne NPP remained disconnected throughout the reporting period following earlier military damage;
On 26 February, Chornobyl NPP lost off-site power, while Khmelnytskyy (and South Ukraine NPP each lost an off-site power line;
On 14 March, Chornobyl experienced a prolonged disconnection requiring activation of emergency diesel generators;
At ZNPP, continued reliance on a single power line and repeated losses of off-site power on 14, 16 and 26 April, and 28 May.
This brings the total number of LOOP events at ZNPP to sixteen since the start of the conflict.
Chair, these incidents do not need to result in an immediate radiological release to be serious: each loss of off-site power and each disruption to grid stability further erodes defence-in-depth and reduces the safety margins on which secure nuclear operations depend.
IAEA reports of a drone strike on the turbine hall at ZNPP further demonstrate how even incidents without immediate radiological impact contribute to worsening risk environment driven by Russia's illegal invasion.
We commend the Director General for his sustained efforts to broker temporary ceasefire arrangements to enable critical repair work at ZNPP. These are important and necessary measures to reduce immediate nuclear risk.
However, let me be clear: we should not be in this position at all.
The simplest way to reduce nuclear risk is for Russia to cease its aggression and withdraw from Ukraine. Nothing less will deliver the conditions required for safe and secure nuclear operations.
Thank you.
