Briefing With Senior State Department Official On Office of Inspector General's Report on Certification for Arms

MODERATOR: Hey, good afternoon, everybody, and thanks for joining us on this call, this on-background briefing on the Office of the Inspector General's report, the May 2019 Emergency Certification for Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Jordan. For your awareness but not for reporting, joining us on the call to brief is [Senior State Department Official]. He will be referred to as a senior State Department official. As a reminder, the contents of this call are embargoed until its completion. And with that, I'll go ahead and turn it over to [Senior State Department Official].

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Great. Thank you, [Moderator]. So good afternoon, everybody. I wanted to share the findings in the report that came out from the State Department's Office of Inspector General, which essentially confirmed in their final report that the department acted in complete accordance of the law and found no wrongdoing in the administration's exercise of the emergency authorities that are available under the Arms Export Control Act, or the AECA.

I'd like to actually particularly note that the principal finding is that Secretary Pompeo's emergency certification back in May of 2019 regarding these 22 proposed sales and transfers of U.S. defense equipment articles to Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Jordan - this is totaling $8.1 billion - was completely consistent with all the statutory requirements and well within the realm of the Secretary's authorities.

To note specifically the OIG did determine that the Secretary's May 2019 use of emergency authority was executed in accordance with statutes within the requirements of Section 36 of the AECA. The OIG determined the emergency certification was properly executed, and the OIG determined the documentation compiled with the requirements outlined in the AECA.

So again, re-emphasizing here that what was what was confirmed in that final report is the department did its job; the Secretary used the authorities that were afforded to him in the AECA. And again, it's not really a unique determination. If anything, the report also notes that this certification process, this emergency authority, has been applied elsewhere. In fact, so most of you on this call may recall the department having cited other applications of the emergency certification authority - three that I will cite here. Again, for those of you who have been following this, this is not new but this is also cited in the OIG report.

One of them, President Carter in 1979 sought emergency certification for a Saudi-financed (inaudible) facility in North Yemen to combat South Yemen's Marxist insurgency. And then later in 1984, President Reagan sought to provide Saudi Arabia with Stinger missiles to deter Iranian threats to their infrastructure and (inaudible). And then in - then further in 1990, President George H.W. Bush sought to expedite equipment to Saudi Arabia ahead of the Gulf War in 1990. Those citations, including for Geroge W. Bush and, of course, President Donald Trump, were included in the applications, and the OIG cited those as historic citations that were relevant to the application of the emergency certification - again, far from a unique determination in that sense.

The big takeaway from this is, again, OIG determined that the Secretary used these authorities in accordance with the law and that the certification was properly executed by the Department of State.

So at this point, I'm happy to take any questions, to talk with you about the posture in the region. I would offer that the threat has not abated and the necessity for the certification that was made a year ago is still a requirement and was the right thing to do. And the response to that was exactly what was necessary in 2019 and remains applicable.

So [Moderator], if you want to open up the call.

MODERATOR: Yes. So we'll take your questions. If you want to get in the question queue, dial 1 and then 0. For our first question, can we go to the line of Nick Wadhams?

QUESTION: Hey. I just wanted to ask - I know this may be difficult, but it's very hard to figure out specific questions to ask you when we haven't actually seen the report and aren't able to see for ourselves whether it amounts to the complete exoneration that you said it is. Is it at all possible for you to send us the report so we can ask those questions? Thank you.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The OIG will be issuing the report if they haven't already. This is sequenced with their pushing out the report. So yes. What I was reading to you were citations from the report, the OIG determinations. So that - that release is imminent - if not this evening, then tomorrow, from my understanding.

MODERATOR: Okay. For our next question, let's go to the line of Joel Gehrke.

QUESTION: Hi, thanks for doing this. I just wondered - this is kind of a housekeeping question following up on my colleague - but who signed off on this report? Given Mr. Akard's recent departure, how was it - how was it conducted? Was it related to his departure, or would it have been done independently of him, or just how did that work?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Right. So you're talking about the final issuance? So yeah, so prior to completion of the report, as you know, the previous IG was removed and then Steve Akard was in as acting. So as far as issuance, to your question on the administration of this, the acting inspector general, he had recused himself from this matter and delegated the responsibility to a deputy inspector general, Diana Shaw. And so that - as far as like that issuance was - is via - via the deputy. So that would be Deputy Inspector Diana Shaw on the final issuance of this.

MODERATOR: Great. Let's go to the line of —

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I just want to go back just because there is a technical question. Just for your understanding of the timeline, the OIG had briefed their findings to the department in November of 2019 and in March and found no wrongdoing at the time. So the - if you go back to when all the work was essentially completed, those findings were briefed late last year and again in March.

MODERATOR: Great. For our next question, let's go to the line of Humeyra Pamuk, Reuters.

QUESTION: Hello. Thank you. I was just wondering if - will the license for Saudi Arabia to make precision munitions be revoked? I'm just wondering about that. And I'm also wondering, as you know, House has an investigation into this, and they sent - they've issued subpoenas. Does the Secretary and his aides have any plans to oblige by those subpoenas? Thank you.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Can you restate your first part about the PGMs, because I heard that and I didn't hear the first part of it. Ma'am?

MODERATOR: Humeyra, if you could press 1 and 0, get back in queue so that we can bring your line back up.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Your line is open. Please, go ahead, Humeyra.

QUESTION: Can you hear me?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah, now I can hear you fine.

QUESTION: All right. So Raytheon license to produce precision guided munitions in Saudi Arabia. I was just wondering if there - if it actually got even on the table whether that license is going to be revoked.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: So the provision of PGMs to Saudi Arabia was included through related co-production arrangements as well as the actual munition itself, and it was part of that emergency certification or emergency notification that went out in May of 2019. This was definitely part of the analysis is factoring in within our particular national interests, and when we're looking at the response to the Iranian threat that was emanating not only directly from Iran but from proxy forces, this is where we did include PGMs in the emergency declaration.

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