Australia is becoming increasingly unequal.
Author
- Intifar Chowdhury
Lecturer in Government, Flinders University
The story is unmissably generational: young Australians today face a tougher reality than their parents and grandparents.
Despite having greater access to education and information, they are more precarious, indebted, insecure and anxious than ever before .
This paradox has deep implications for the social fabric of our nation.
Financial, educational and employment insecurities are converging to affect mental health and psychological wellbeing, shaping how young people form relationships, start families, and engage with society and politics.
Intergenerational inequality is the term on the lips of policymakers in Canberra and beyond. In this four-part series, we've asked leading experts what's making younger generations worse off and how policy could help fix it.
Who's young?
Generational cuts aren't an exact science. Some researchers use five- or ten-year birth cohorts, while others prefer 15-year bins shaped by key social and political events in the most impressionable formative years.
But for me, youth isn't just about age groups. It's the time before acquiring key markers of adulthood.
Educational credentials, financial independence, home ownership, partnership and parenthood may not be universal goals, and many choose to opt out. But the reality is, more young people are less capable, or taking far longer, to gain the capacity to opt in.
Here are five charts that show how all these factors work together to screw over young Australians.
1. Education: a costly gateway to adulthood
Education should be the essential recipe for a stable job, but it's taking longer and costing more. In less than two decades, average student loan debt for people in their 20s has more than doubled, increasing by 145%.
If debts had only tracked up with inflation, they'd be 62% higher.
While graduate salaries have increased by about 2.5 times since 1996, student contributions have surged by up to 6.2 times, meaning HECS-HELP debts now consume a larger share of starting incomes.
Notably, the Labor government's recent reform , which raised the repayment threshold from $56,156 to $67,000 from 2025-26, will ease early repayment burdens.
But financial stress starts well before graduation. Most rental listings are unaffordable for those on Youth Allowance, and one in seven full-time students also worked full-time in 2023, double the rate in the 1990s.
2. Home ownership: a disappearing dream
Home ownership has long symbolised financial stability. But for young Australians, it's increasingly out of reach.
The latest Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) data report shows 26.5% of those born between 1974 and 1977 owned homes by age 25 to 28, compared to just 18% of those born between 1994 and 1997.
In 2023, dwelling prices rose nearly 5% , far ahead of wage growth.
Over the past 25 years, the average dwelling has gone from costing nine times annual household income per capita to 16.4 times in 2024.
Housing affordability is now so strained that many young Australians no longer see home ownership as essential. A 2024 Australian National University (ANU) survey found growing sentiment among youth that owning a home is no longer important to Australia's way of life.
In 2024-25, an estimated 1.26 million low-income households were in housing stress, spending more than 30% of their disposable income on shelter.
These households are more likely to be headed by younger people, first-home buyers, single parents and those in the lowest income bracket. The reality is not just delayed ownership, but a structural shift that risks locking younger generations out of stability altogether.
3. Psychological distress: the silent crisis of youth
Across all age groups, psychological distress has been rising , but younger Australians are bearing the brunt.
Between 2011 and 2021, distress among 15 to 24-year-olds more than doubled, from 18.4% to 42.3%. For those aged 25 to 34, prevalence reached 32.7% in 2021.
The likelihood of distress declines with age, but the cohort effect is striking. Young people today are twice as distressed as their 2007 counterparts.
Distress is significantly higher among income support recipients and those in insecure housing, particularly renters and social housing tenants.
These vulnerabilities converge in youth.
The 2025 Australian Unity Wellbeing Index survey found young Australians are some of the least satisfied with life, with adults aged 18 to 34 reporting the highest levels of mental distress and loneliness, and some of the lowest levels of personal wellbeing compared to any group across the adult lifespan.
Financial hardship, housing stress and unemployment were key drivers.
4. Loneliness: not just an old person's problem
Loneliness has shifted from being an issue exclusively of old age to a defining feature of youth.
According to the 2024 HILDA statistical report , the share of lonely people aged 15 to 24 rose from 14.4% in 2008 to 20.2% in 2019.
The pandemic accelerated this trend, with loneliness jumping to 26.6% in 2020 and remaining high in the two years following. No other age group saw a similar increase.
In fact, older Australians, once the loneliest, now report the lowest levels of loneliness.
The 2025 ANU Election Monitoring Survey , conducted in October 2024, found loneliness and financial stress are strongly linked to political disengagement. Affected people reported lower satisfaction with democracy and reduced trust in institutions.
These findings echo the research on distress discussed above.
As loneliness and distress rise, the consequences extend beyond individual wellbeing to broader social and civic life.
5. Delayed adulthood: changing familial milestones
Young Australians are entering adulthood later and under more pressure. More are living with parents into their late 20s and early 30s, often while studying or working in low-paid jobs.
Census data show the proportion of young adults living at home has increased across every age group since 2006, with the sharpest rise between 2016 and 2021.
This shift reflects broader economic conditions, including housing unaffordability and labour market instability, especially during the pandemic.
Relationship formation is also changing. Young people are entering first marriages later. Women are having children later or not at all.
The proportion of first-time mothers aged 30 and over has more than doubled since the 1980s, but the fertility rates of every age group under 35 have declined since the mid-2010s.
Overall, fertility rates have dropped to a record low of 1.5 babies per woman, starkly below the current level needed for population replacement.
Meanwhile, childcare costs have surged, with weekly spending rising from $71 in 2002 to $192 in 2022, potentially affecting people's choices about how many children they have, or if they have any at all.
These demographic trends have long-term implications for care and dependency, as fewer children will be available to support ageing parents.
Relationship pressures are also intensifying. Nearly half of young people aged 18 to 24 report that work or study commitments strain their most important relationships. Almost one in three face four or more pressures at once.
These shifts in household dynamics, fertility, and relationship stability reflect a broader delay in achieving traditional markers of adulthood. For many young people, the path to independence is not only slower but more fragile, shaped by economic constraints and social change.
It's also clear that financial, educational, and employment insecurities are no longer isolated challenges. They are converging to shape mental health and psychological wellbeing, influencing how young people form relationships, start families, and engage with society and politics.
Intergenerational inequality is not just an economic issue, but a social and democratic one.
Intifar Chowdhury does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
