The Department of the Air Force released its report on the results of an Air Force Inspector General investigation in response to the unauthorized disclosure of classified information by an individual at the 102nd Intelligence Wing, Otis Air National Guard Base, Massachusetts.
The Secretary of the Air Force directed the investigation of compliance with policy, procedures and standards and the unit environment at the 102 IW. The investigation also included organizations and areas outside the unit. The IG investigation was separate from the criminal investigation into the actions of Airman 1st Class Jack D. Teixeira being led by the Department of Justice.
Report of Investigation
According to the IG investigation report, the cause of the unauthorized disclosure remains the alleged actions of one individual, A1C Teixeira, who has been indicted on six counts for the unauthorized disclosure of national defense information, and is awaiting a trial date.
The IG investigation found individuals in Teixeira's unit failed to take proper action after becoming aware of his intelligence-seeking activities. However, the investigation did not find evidence that members of Teixeira's supervisory chain were aware of his alleged unauthorized disclosures.
Indirect factors that enabled Teixeira's unauthorized disclosure include the failure of commanders to adequately inspect areas under their command, inconsistent guidance for reporting security incidents, inconsistent definitions of the "Need to Know" concept, conflation of classified system access with the "Need to Know" principle, inefficient and ineffective processes for administering disciplinary actions, lack of supervision/oversight of night shift operations and a failure to provide security clearance field investigation results.
Finally, the IG investigation found 102 IW leadership was not vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who were placed under their command. The IG investigation specifically found the 102 IW leadership did not effectively prioritize the immediate mission security by not taking the required actions to accomplish security program responsibilities fully and effectively.
"Every Airman and Guardian is entrusted with the solemn duty to safeguard our nation's classified defense information. When there is a breach of that sacred trust, for any reason, we will act in accordance with our laws and policies to hold responsible individuals accountable," said Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall. "Our national security demands leaders at every level protect critical assets, ensuring they do not fall into the hands of those who would do the United States or our allies and partners harm."
Accountability Actions
Beginning on Sept. 7, 2023, Air National Guard leaders initiated disciplinary and other administrative actions against 15 individuals, ranging in rank from E-5 to O-6, for dereliction in the performance of duties. The actions ranged from relieving personnel from their positions, including command positions, to non-judicial punishment under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Col. Sean Riley, 102 IW commander, received administrative action and was relieved of command for cause and Enrique Dovalo, 102d Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Group commander received administrative action for concerns with unit culture and compliance with policies and standards.
Previously suspended commanders from the 102d Intelligence Support Squadron and the detachment overseeing administrative support for Airmen at the unit mobilized for duty under Title 10 USC were permanently removed.
The 102nd Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Group was taken off mission when Teixeira was discovered as the source of the unauthorized disclosures. The group's mission remains reassigned to other organizations within the Air Force.
Department of the Air Force-Wide Security Improvements
As a result of a department-wide security stand-down conducted within 30 days of the unauthorized disclosure, Airmen and Guardians reviewed security procedure compliance, attended security training and were surveyed on enterprise-wide information security practices.
The Department of the Air Force has implemented several reforms to improve procedures related to need to know and classified access, in addition to improving accountability for protection of classified and sensitive information. Clearance approval levels and need-to-know are two fundamentally distinct concepts.
Additional reforms include: improving need-to-know enforcement for electronic and hard-copy classified information; providing additional guidance on layered physical security protections for facilities and systems; increasing clarity on the responsibility of individuals and commanders to report behaviors of concern; ensuring hand-off and receipt occurs within personnel security systems when individuals transfer to other assignments; increased emphasis on cyber hygiene; and improving security training content and delivery.
The need to balance information security protections with the requirement to get the right information to the right people at the right time is a national security imperative and remains a critical focus as Airmen and Guardians work to implement corrective actions and replicate best practices.
