Kleptocratic "ecosystems" should be seen as transnational enterprises and national security threats, with the recovery of assets legally linked not only to the individual criminal acts but to the systemic harm caused to national security and democracy, experts have warned.
The paper argues that work should pivot away from just confiscating the wealth of individual actors to focusing on disrupting entire kleptocratic networks- a conceptual and legal shift that would allow networks themselves to be treated as illegal entities.
Over time, this shift would strengthen the UK's capacity to recover stolen or corruptly acquired assets, hold professional enablers accountable, and demonstrate genuine leadership in global anti-corruption efforts.
The study says that despite innovative new legislation, the UK's track record in confiscating wealth derived from kleptocracy remains weak. The country continues to function as a safe haven for stolen wealth, undermining its credibility as a rule-of-law jurisdiction and creating risks for both national and international security.
A focus on kleptocratic networks and treating them in the same way as organised crime could encourage intelligence-sharing between UK agencies and international partners to trace asset flows across borders. It could also encourage cooperation with financial institutions and the private sector, who will have unique insight into illicit networks. But it requires investigative capacity and skills, and more robust public-private partnerships and real-time information exchange mechanisms.
A formal kleptocratic "impact threshold" akin to the "threat level" system used in counter-terrorism could be developed, shifting the focus from historic criminal acts to the present day societal and security impact of kleptocratic enterprises. The existence of a kleptocratic network, or the identification of "systemic impact" would activate work to recover assets.
The Kleptocratic Enterprise: lessons from organised crime to target transnational corruption and strengthen asset recovery in the UK is authored by Maria Nizzero, John Heathershaw and Tom Mayne from the University of Exeter, produced under the research project "Identifying Enabler Networks and their Vulnerabilities".
This study draws on research conducted under the Governance & Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence (GI ACE) programme hosted by the Centre for the Study of Corruption which generates actionable evidence that policymakers, practitioners and advocates can use to design and implement more effective anti-corruption initiatives.
Dr Nizzero said: "The UK is not powerless in terms of legislation available, but there is a current failure to understand modern kleptocracy. It is systemic, transnational, and networked and operates to all effects as a cross-border enterprise to indulge elites who have used their political access to enrich themselves and maintain political power.
"The current model should be reoriented away from individual asset recovery and toward disrupting whole kleptocratic entreprises."
Professor Heathershaw said: "Without conceptual changes it is probable that legal and financial professionals working directly or indirectly for kleptocrats will find new legal ways of hiding, protecting and legitimizing their assets in the UK. The ingenuity of the recent economic crime legislation passed by the previous government and the political capital expended by the current government will be in vain."
The study argues that legal instruments in the UK, including the Proceeds of Crime Act (2002), the Terrorism Act (TACT) 2000, and the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act (SAMLA) 2018, already contain underused powers, which could be deployed in combination to target kleptocratic networks more effectively. But the UK should also look at international asset recovery best practices to maximise and, eventually, amend its approach to asset recovery of kleptocratic proceeds.
Existing civil and criminal recovery powers should be fully depoloyed, including by potentially revising definitions of "unlawful conduct" to capture assets obtained through political patronage and systemic corruption.
Mr Mayne said: "We are proposing a radical shift, but reform should reduce, not increase, the work of the law enforcement agencies in fighting kleptocracy. After some initial heavy lifting by civil servants and legal experts, criminal conspiracy and money laundering offences will be easier to investigate and prosecute and will likely have a much greater chance of success. A greater proportion of stolen assets may be recovered. Sanctioning enablers should become easier."
In the study researchers use several real examples of kleptocracy to demonstrate recurring obstacles that prevent effective recovery of kleptocratic assets in the UK, including the use and abuse of complex ownership structures by kleptocrats; the historical origins of criminality; the involvement of professional enablers; uncooperative jurisdictions; reliance on predicate offences in the current UK asset recovery model and lack of resources.
