Stats NZ Implements Fee-Based Data Request Fines

This report summarises the feedback received during public consultation on the proposed design of an infringement scheme to support Stats NZ's mandatory data requests.

Public consultation ran from 23 February to 6 April 2026, supported by the discussion document.

Download the PDF below or read the report online.

On this page

Purpose
Overview of submitters
Overarching themes
Responses by consultation questions
Next steps

Purpose

Stats NZ is working to implement an infringement scheme to support the mandatory information requests we make to people, businesses, and organisations. Public consultation ran from 23 February to 6 April 2026, supported by the discussion document that detailed how the infringement scheme could work and the proposed fee and fine amounts.

This document summarises the feedback we received during public consultation on the proposed design of the scheme.

Overview of submitters

We received a total of 45 submissions, with 19 from organisations and 26 from individuals. The organisations that submitted included five iwi and other Māori organisations (including one Māori youth organisation), five public sector organisations, four Pacific organisations, two disability organisations, two civil society organisations, and one business group.

Figure 1 Overview of submitters

Overarching themes

Overall, submitters were split between supporting and opposing the proposed design of the infringement scheme, with a slight majority supporting it. Submissions ranged from wanting the infringement scheme to be stronger and more punitive than the proposed design, to disagreeing with the use of infringements entirely.

Most of the feedback related to three main themes:

• theme 1: understanding how non-compliance is defined, and how this can impact who may be in the scope of the scheme
• theme 2: the range of barriers respondents can face when asked to provide information
• theme 3: concern that an infringement scheme may be implemented inequitably/have inequitable outcomes.

Relating to theme 1 (defining non-compliance), submitters wanted Stats NZ to:

• clearly define deliberate non-response
• consider reasons for non-compliance, including distrust of government, the inaccessibility of the data request, and financial hardship, among many other reasons
• publish criteria so there is transparency about what behaviour is considered deliberate non-compliance and could result in an infringement notice.

On theme 2 (barriers), submitters suggested that Stats NZ should:

• demonstrate a certain level of engagement and the provision of accessible information before an infringement notice is issued
• use more community engagement to avoid the need for infringement offences
• be clear about whether Stats NZ is changing its compliance approach to focus on enforcement over other methods (such as engagement and support).

Relating to theme 3 (inequitable outcomes), submitters recommended that Stats NZ support equitable outcomes by:

• monitoring and reporting on the use of infringements
• providing opportunities to appeal
• ensuring the central team is equity-focused
• scaling the amounts of fines.

Many of these recommendations had a particular focus on Māori, Pacific, and disability perspectives. Some submitters asked whether infringements and the approach to implementation were culturally appropriate.

Submitters also questioned whether the proposed infringement scheme aligns with our obligations under te Tiriti o Waitangi, the Data and Statistics Act 2022, and other legislation.

Submitters were split on whether infringements would improve data quality because of increased response rates, or whether data quality would get worse because respondents may submit false information to avoid a fine.

Submitters expressed a range of views as to whether the proposed fee and maximum fine amounts were reasonable and would provide a credible deterrent. Some felt the proposed amounts were about right, while others felt they were too high for low-income respondents and small businesses, and too low for wealthier respondents and larger businesses.

Some submitters suggested means-testing the fee and fine amounts to ensure there was an equal impact across different income groups.

Responses by consultation questions

The discussion document asked the following questions:

1. Do you agree that the most appropriate use of infringement offences is when there is an ongoing issue with non-compliance and other tools have been used? Why? Why not?
2. Do you agree that infringement offences should apply to respondents who deliberately avoid their obligation to provide information? Why? Why not?
3. Do you have other suggestions about how we can make sure infringement offences are used consistently across collections and cases of non-compliance?
4. Do you have other suggestions about how we can make sure infringement offences are used fairly and equitably?
5. Given the offence involved, do you think the proposed fee and fine amounts are reasonable? Why? Why not?
6. In your view, do the proposed fee and fine amounts provide a credible deterrent? Why? Why not?
7. What other costs or benefits do you think could result from introducing infringement offences?
8. Do you have any other feedback about how we propose to use infringement offences?

This section summarises the responses to each question.

1. Do you agree that the most appropriate use of infringement offences is when there is an ongoing issue with non-compliance and other tools have been used? Why? Why not?

This question received 37 responses. Many submitters (54 percent) agreed that the most appropriate use of infringements is for ongoing non-compliance, 32 percent disagreed, and 14 percent of responses were unclear.

Figure 2 Do you agree that the most appropriate use of infringement offences is when there is an ongoing issue with non-compliance and other tools have been used? Why? Why not?

Many agreed that the most appropriate use of infringement offences was when there was an ongoing issue with non-compliance and other tools had been used. A small number of these submitters agreed with caveats, such as the equitable implementation of the infringement scheme. The majority of those who agreed thought criminal prosecution was too heavy-handed, and emphasised that infringements should be a last-resort option following normal community-engagement approaches.

"Yes, I agree - as a business unit that relies on up-to-date information to identify trends and make practical decisions, I value all inputs to get a clearer picture." - individual

Some disagreed with the proposed use of infringements. Of those who disagreed, the majority were concerned that this was a move away from Stats NZ's community-engagement focus, and raised reasons for non-compliance that they believed would not be addressed by infringements.

"The proposal assumes that persistent non-compliance reflects deliberate behaviour. From our community perspective, this is not the reality. Ongoing non-response is more often a signal that existing approaches are not working for certain groups, particularly those already facing barriers such as mobility, digital access, language, literacy, and trust in government systems." - organisation

2. Do you agree that infringement offences should apply to respondents who deliberately avoid their obligation to provide information? Why? Why not?

This question received 38 responses. Many submitters (58 percent) agreed that infringement offences should apply to respondents who deliberately avoid their obligation to provide information, 29 percent disagreed, and the position was unclear in 13 percent of responses.

Figure 3 Do you agree that infringement offences should apply to respondents who deliberately avoid their obligation to provide information? Why? Why not?

"Enforcement is appropriate where non-compliance is intentional, as this supports fairness and data integrity. However, it is important that offences are not applied where there are genuine reasons for non-compliance, such as illness or bereavement." - individual

Those that did not agree raised concerns that other reasons for non-compliance (barriers such as language, disability, distrust in government) may be misconstrued as deliberate non-compliance.

"In relation to Pacific peoples, delays in responding to data requests may reflect competing cultural responsibilities, mistrust of government due to past experiences, or misunderstandings about the purpose of the data. These nuances must be carefully considered so that genuine inability is not misinterpreted as deliberate avoidance." - public sector organisation

3. Do you have other suggestions about how we can make sure infringement offences are used consistently across collections and cases of non-compliance?

Many submitters raised concerns about inequitable outcomes in response to this question. Recommendations to ensure consistency in the use of infringement offences include transparency and accountability mechanisms for Stats NZ, such as:

• developing criteria that explains what behaviour could result in an infringement
• defining and documenting Stats NZ's obligations/processes
• ensuring the central team is focused on ensuring equity
• monitoring and reporting publicly on enforcement patterns.

"There must be criteria to be looked at before an infringement offence is actioned. Example: respondent had been approached (visited and met with) at least three times, and a personalised letter issued." - individual

"Because Stats NZ acknowledges oversampling of Māori in some collections, monitoring must include disaggregated reporting of enforcement rates by ethnicity from the outset." - organisation

4. Do you have other suggestions about how we can make sure infringement offences are used fairly and equitably?

Many responses to this question focused on concern over inequitable outcomes. Suggestions to promote equitable outcomes include scaled/means-tested fine amounts, the use of equity assessments when issuing infringements to identify impacts for different people, and publicly reporting on the infringements scheme.

"Fines should scale with entity size and amount of non-compliance. It's not fair that a large multinational can essentially pay to exclude themselves from mandatory requests whereas smaller businesses can't." - individual

Another theme raised was that there can be many reasons for non-compliance. Some submitters suggested that if a greater focus was placed on reducing barriers to compliance, such as the difficulty of completing surveys, infringements would not be needed.

"Ensure compliance is easy and not time consuming, and eliminate the possibility that non-compliance is simply due to not knowing about the collection/obligation." - individual

"Non-compliance is often driven by structural factors such as poverty, digital exclusion, distrust in the Government, and historical trauma, rather than by deliberate refusal." - organisation

5. Given the offence involved, do you think the proposed fee and fine amounts are reasonable? Why? Why not?

This question received 36 responses, with 33 percent agreeing that the proposed fee and fine amounts were reasonable, and 58 percent saying the amounts were unreasonable. Some responses were unclear (9 percent).

Figure 4 Do you think the proposed fee and fine amounts are reasonable? Why? Why not?

Of those who thought the amounts were unreasonable, some thought they were too low (11 percent of total responses), some thought they were too high (5 percent of total responses), some thought they were inequitable (28 percent of total responses), and some thought they were unreasonable because they did not agree with using infringements at all (14 percent of total responses).

Those who thought the fine amounts were inequitable were concerned that they would impact low-income communities too much, while not impacting/deterring wealthy communities enough. Many submitters were concerned that low-income communities would not be able to afford the fines, while wealthy people and businesses who could easily afford the fines may prefer to pay than complete the data request.

"For a struggling Pacific household, an elder on a fixed income, or a small community organisation already stretched thin, a $100 fee can be significant and punitive. For larger entities, the same logic cuts the other way: the proposed corporate amounts may be too low to change behaviour." - organisation

Many of those who thought the fine amounts were unreasonable recommended having scaled or means-tested fine amounts, so that the fines would be more equitable and more likely to have similar impacts on low-income communities and wealthy people.

Several submitters suggested that the proposed amounts were not proportionate or comparable to other infringement regimes (such as speeding tickets), because there was no direct public safety risk associated with non-response to data requests.

6. In your view, do the proposed fee and fine amounts provide a credible deterrent? Why? Why not?

This question received 37 responses. Some submitters (24 percent) agreed that the proposed amounts provided a credible deterrent and would help to bolster Stats NZ's authority and credibility as an organisation. Of the 24 percent who agreed, almost half said this with caveats (for example, that the system is enacted equitably, and/or that Stats NZ works to remove barriers to compliance).

"Yes, higher fee amounts are more likely to act as a credible deterrent. If the penalty is significant, respondents may be more motivated to take part in the survey and meet their obligations." - individual

Figure 5 In your view, do the proposed fee and fine amounts provide a credible deterrent? Why? Why not?

Many submitters (65 percent) did not think the proposed fee and fine amounts were a credible deterrent. A few (14 percent) believed the amounts were too low to be credible, while another 14 percent raised equity concerns. Some submitters (27 percent) believed that fines were never a credible deterrent for several reasons, including:

• that for cultural reasons, particularly in Māori and Pacific communities, compliance is not driven by punishment; it is driven by engagement, trust, and relationship
• that financial penalties do not solve the causes of non-compliance or the barriers to compliance.

"There will be some people who consider $300 to be a bargain in exchange for not having to take part in a multi-session survey like HLFS." - individual

"For large businesses, the proposed amounts are unlikely to register as meaningful. For low-income individuals and small community organisations, they risk causing real harm before they produce any improvement in compliance." - organisation

7. What other costs or benefits do you think could result from introducing infringement offences?

Benefits raised by submitters included that infringements would save data collectors time, and therefore taxpayer money. Some submitters thought that infringements could support data being available more quickly and frequently.

"Potential benefits include more timely resolution of persistent non-compliance, and reduced follow-up burden in specific cases." - individual

Submitters were equally split on whether data quality could improve or decline, with 13 submitters raising this on either side. Those who believed it would improve thought that infringements would result in higher response rates, while those who thought data quality would get worse were concerned that infringements would cause people to submit false data to avoid fines.

The main perceived cost of introducing infringements, suggested by 13 submitters on this question, would be increased distrust in government. Many submitters said that those who do not respond to data requests do not trust Stats NZ and the government as a whole, and this could be exacerbated by an infringement scheme. Submitters also raised inequitable outcomes, along with potential increased administrative burden for Stats NZ in issuing infringements, or legal and reputational risk if the system was found to be discriminatory, as costs that could arise.

"There is also a risk that introducing infringement offences changes the nature of the relationship between Stats NZ and communities. A system that relies on penalties may achieve short-term compliance in some cases but can undermine long-term participation and goodwill." - organisation

8. Do you have any other feedback about how we propose to use infringement offences?

Other suggestions raised included:

• providing koha or incentives to respondents to encourage participation
• co-designing implementation of the infringement scheme with Māori/Pacific/disability communities to ensure necessary safeguards to avoid inequitable outcomes
• focusing on community engagement and building trust and relationships with communities rather than enforcement
• developing clear criteria about what constitutes deliberate ongoing non-compliance
• improving accessibility of Stats NZ's processes to remove barriers to compliance (including alternate formats for disabled people, different languages, ensuring respondents understand the request, etc).

"Disabled and deaf people may face barriers in complying with information requests for a range of reasons, including due to accessibility barriers (particularly with online content). For this reason, it is important that appropriate safeguards are put in place to ensure that the infringement regime does not disproportionally affect deaf and disability communities." - public sector organisation

Next steps

Stats NZ is now planning how the infringement scheme will operate in practice.

This work will include addressing the key themes that emerged from the public consultation.

Stats NZ will seek agreement to take the proposed regulations to Cabinet for approval in 2027.

We will share further updates on the infringement scheme as our work progresses.

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