Keynote speech by Philip R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Research Symposium on AI and the economy
My aim today is to describe how AI is reshaping the euro area economy.[1] I thank Malin Andersson, Ursel Bauman, Elena Bobeica, Katalin Bodnar, Veronica Campostrini, Leonardo Carrai, Kaustubh Dharmapuri, Paola Di Casola, António Dias Da Silva, Julia Doleschel, Lorenz Emter, Annalisa Ferrando, Irene Ferrari, Max Freier, Johannes Groß, Vanessa Gunnella, Valerie Jarvis, Gerrit Koester, Borbala Kovacs, Marton Kovacs, Tibor Lalinský, Sara Lamboglia, Laura Lebastard, Peter McQuade, Baptiste Meunier, Roberto Motto, Giulio Nicoletti, Iván Ordoñez Martínez, Chiara Osbat, Fausto Pastoris, Klara Pavić, José Ramos, Judit Rariga, Stefan Schaefer, Caspar Matthias Schauhoff, Maurice Schmidt, Martin Schmitz, Fabian Schupp, Silvia Scopel, Marta Skrzypińska, David Sondermann, Sigurd Steffensen, Marcel Tirpak, Paulina Ullrich, Jules Voisin, Jakob Wenzl and Dennis Zander for their contributions to this speech. The views expressed are my own and should not be interpreted as representing the collective view of the ECB Governing Council.
The monetary policy statement released after yesterday's ECB monetary policy meeting cited AI as a driver of current economic activity. It is beyond the scope of this speech to review yesterday's meeting but a slide deck is included as an annex to this speech on the ECB website.
In addition, European firms are part of the global AI supply chain, while European investors are contributing to the funding of the global buildout of AI infrastructure through equity and debt markets and the banking system.
I will also describe the key patterns we see in the data, with a primary focus on how the surveys conducted by the ECB can provide insights into the AI adoption process and the implications for the financial system.[3] For a broader overview of how AI may affect the euro area economy, see Lane, P.R. (2026), "AI and the euro area economy", keynote speech at ECB-SAFE-RCEA International Conference on the Climate-Macro-Finance Interface (3CMFI), Frankfurt, 23 March. See also: Lane, P.R. (2026), "The AI opportunity for Europe", dinner remarks at the International AI Summit, Dublin, 13 October.
For a comparison of AI adoption in Europe and the US, see Bick, A., Blandin, A., Deming, D. J., Fuchs,-Schündeln, N. and Jessen, J. (2026), "Mind the Gap: AI Adoption in Europe and the U.S.", NBER Working Paper, No. 34995, March. The major AI producers also provide insightful data on AI adoption patterns. These include: Anthropic (2026), "Anthropic Economic Index", June 26 ; the recent reports by OpenAI on the adoption of agentic AI in Europe (OpenAI (2026), "The EU's next chapter on AI is agentic", October 14) and on how consumers use ChatGPT for work (OpenAI (2026), "ChatGPT's expanding world of work," October 26); and Microsoft (2026), "Global AI Diffusion Report", Q2 2026 Trends and Insights. Payments data can also be used to track the economic impact of AI: see Stripe Economics (2026), "An empirical agenda for AI," October 8; and Stripe Economics (2026), "Europe versus the US: how big is the AI gap?", October 28.
Aggregate trends
Digital investment in the euro area has expanded by 73 per cent in real terms since 2014, increasing from 2.3 per cent to 3.3 per cent of GDP (Chart 1a). While digital investment has grown far more quickly in the United States, the surge in digital investment (with an estimated clear acceleration since 2024) marks a distinct shift in the structure of the euro area economy.[5] As a share of GDP, digital investment in the United States has expanded from 3.3 per cent in 2014 to 7.3 per cent in H1 2026.
Data centres are a subcomponent of the category "buildings and structures" in the ICT sector.
Chart 1
Digital investment in the euro area
a) Digital investment proxy, euro area |
b) Digital investment proxy, euro area, with asset breakdown |
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(2014 = 100) |
(EUR billion) |
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Sources: Eurostat, ECB and ECB calculations. Notes: Chart 1a shows the digital proxy for the euro area business economy, at constant 2020 prices, indexed to 2014. The blue dots for 2025 and 2026 extend the digital investment proxy based on the annual growth of an output proxy for digital services (weighted non-seasonally adjusted production of publishing activities; computer programming, consultancy and related activities; and information service activities). Chart 1b shows a digital proxy which refers to (i) investment in non-residential buildings and structures in the information and communication sector, (ii) information and communication technology (ICT) equipment in the business economy, (iii) investment in computer software and databases (CSDBs) in the business economy, excluding the ICT sector, and (iv) total intellectual property products (IPP) investment (in CSDBs and research and development) by the ICT sector. Missing country values are estimated based on known euro area aggregates of country-sector shares. On a whole-economy basis, digital investment has increased from around 2.3 per cent of euro area GDP in 2014 to 3.0 per cent in 2024 (and looks to have increased to 3.3 per cent by the end of the first half of 2026, on the basis of updates of digital services output). The latest observations are for 2024 for euro area annual accounts and July 2026 for euro area production data. |
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In the ECB Corporate Telephone Survey, firms report that AI has added about 10 per cent to their capital expenditure plans this year. AI-related demand has helped activity to hold up over the last two years - as reflected by the contributions of the "computers and other electronics" and "information and communication services" sectors to total market production (Chart 2a). As illustrated in Chart 2b, Purchasing Managers' Index (PMI) indicators show that output, employment and new orders have developed considerably more favourably in the technology equipment subsector than in other manufacturing subsectors. For services, the software subsector has performed better than other services sectors in terms of output, albeit not in terms of employment and new orders.
Chart 2
Effects of the global AI boom on euro area output
a) Total market production |
b) PMIs for technology equipment and software in manufacturing and services |
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(cumulated changes since January 2025 in per cent) |
(diffusion indices, average January-September 2026) |
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Sources: Eurostat and ECB calculations Note: The latest observations are for July 2026. |
Sources: S&P Global and ECB calculations. Notes: Sectoral labels are taken from the July Global PMI press release. The latest observations are for September 2026. |
AI has been the main driver of global goods trade over the last year (Chart 3a). European firms are contributors to the global AI supply chain. Table 4 shows that AI-related exports and imports are growing quickly in the euro area, especially in relation to core data centre goods, which contain directly deployed hardware components related to AI compute, storage and networking capacity. Possibly related to differences in composition, the increase in AI import prices in the euro area is more muted than for the other major economic regions (Chart 3b). Chart 5 shows that, while AI-related price increases have contributed materially to the upward shift in goods inflation, the impact on headline inflation is limited owing to the relatively low weight of AI-exposed goods in the consumer price index (13.3 per cent in the non-energy industrial goods subcomponent and 3.4 per cent of the HICP).
Chart 3
Trade in goods and import prices of AI goods
a) Global goods imports by category |
b) Import prices of AI goods |
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(annual percentage changes, percentage points; de-meaned) |
(annual percentage changes, three-month moving averages) |
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Sources: Trade Data Monitor and ECB staff calculations. Notes: The figures are nominal data. Values are deviations from their respective mean over 2019-2023. "AI-related" reflects a basket of goods related to the construction and operation of AI data centres estimated by Emter et al. (2026) following Waugh (2026). The latest observations are for the second quarter of 2026. |
Sources: Trade Data Monitor, ECB and ECB staff calculations. Notes: Import prices are calculated as unit values. "AI goods" is a basket of goods related to AI data centre construction (Emter et al. 2026; Waugh 2026). Unless otherwise indicated, prices are in US dollars. "Asia - AI exporters" includes Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and the Philippines. The latest observations are for July 2026 for the euro area, Asia and Global, August 2026 for the United States and September 2026 for China. |
Table 4
Trade in AI goods
Trade in AI-related goods and subcomponents |
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(percentage of total trade; annual growth, percentage) |
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Sources: Eurostat, Trade Data Monitor and ECB staff calculations. Notes: The table shows the share and growth in values. Rest of the world refers to the world excluding the euro area and the United States. 2023 shares are the shares of imports/exports in total imports/exports of the respective country or region. "AI-related trade" refers to goods related to the construction and operation of AI data centres (Emter et al., 2026; Waugh, 2026). "Core data centre goods" are directly deployed hardware components related to AI compute, storage, and networking capacity. "Data centre infrastructure goods" are physical infrastructure goods required to power, cool, and operate data centre facilities. "Other AI-related goods" are upstream AI goods and broad industrial goods used in AI production. |
Chart 5
Price pressures from rising prices for AI goods
a) Consumer product exposure to AI goods |
b) HICP weights of AI-exposed goods |
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(percentage of output) |
(percentage points) |
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Sources: Trade Data Monitor, BEA (US Bureau of Economic Analysis), Eurostat and ECB staff calculations. Notes: "AI goods" is a basket of goods related to AI data centre construction (Emter et al. 2026; Waugh, 2026). The data are based on US BEA tables (2017). Exposures are weighted by AI share, based on 2025 nominal trade data. |
Sources: Eurostat and ECB staff calculations. Note: HICP weights in 2026. |
In relation to trade in services, Chart 6 shows a significant upward movement in software licence imports from the United States since 2022, consistent with increased purchasing of AI licences from the leading US firms.[7] Imports of intellectual property from the United States is often organised through intra-firm trade between the US parent corporation and its overseas affiliates. See also Emter, L., Fidora, M., Pastoris, F., Schmitz, M. and Schuler, T. (2025), "US trade policies and the activity of US multinational enterprises in the euro area", Economic Bulletin, Issue 4, ECB.
Chart 6
Euro area intellectual property products imports
Euro area payments for the use of intellectual property products (imports) |
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(four-quarter moving sums in EUR billions) |
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Sources: ECB (euro area balance of payments), BEA (US Bureau of Economic Analysis, US trade in services) and ECB staff calculations. Notes: Euro area charges for the use of intellectual property (imports) are based on quarterly ECB balance of payments data. The latest observations are for the second quarter of 2026. Imports from the United States are broken down by type of intellectual property using annual shares by type in US exports to the euro area, as reported by the BEA (mirror data). These shares are applied to quarterly euro area imports of intellectual property from the United States for the corresponding year. The latest available BEA data refer to 2025; the 2025 shares are also applied to 2026 quarters. |
European investors are also major purchasers of US technology-related equities (Chart 7). Listed European tech firms have also benefited from rising stock market valuations (Chart 8a). Stock returns, revenue growth, operating margin growth and earnings per share growth are all increasing in AI-intensity (Chart 8b).
Chart 7
Euro area purchases of US shares
Net purchases of listed US corporate shares by euro area residents |
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(cumulated flows in EUR billions) |
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Sources: ECB SHSS (Securities Holdings Statistics by Sector), LSEG (London Stock Exchange Group) Data & Analytics, ECB calculations. Notes: The sectoral breakdown is obtained using information from LSEG Data & Analytics on the firms issuing the shares whose International Securities Identification Number (ISIN) is identified in SHSS data. "Other sectors" includes academic and educational services, basic materials, financials, healthcare, institutions, associations and organisations, real estate, energy, industrials, utilities and consumer. The latest observations are for the second quarter of 2026. |
Chart 8
Performance of European AI-related stocks since January 2023
a) Performance of European stock market indices since January 2023 |
b) Stock performance and financial metrics of Euro Stoxx 600 firms by AI intensity since January 2023 |
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(percentages) |
(lower right panel: EUR; other panels: percentage points) |
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Sources: Bloomberg, LSEG (London Stock Exchange Group) and ECB calculations. Notes: Chart 8a shows stock market returns since 2 January 2023, in percentages in euro after adjusting for exchange rate movements, of the S&P500 and Euro Stoxx 600 indices, the subindices S&P 500 Information and Technology excluding Magnificent 7, Magnificent 7 and Euro Stoxx 600 Technology. Magnificent 7 firms comprise: Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Apple, Meta Platforms, Microsoft, NVIDIA and Tesla. Chart 8b shows stock market returns since 2 January 2023 in percentage points of value-weighted portfolios of Euro Stoxx 600 firms sorted by their AI classification. AI intensity groups are based on OECD methodology (for details, see "A sectoral taxonomy of AI intensity", OECD Artificial Intelligence Papers, No 30, December 2024). The classification comprises three AI intensity groups: high, medium and low, based on sectoral quartile allocations across four indicators: 1. AI human capital; 2. AI innovation; 3. Barrier-adjusted AI exposure; and 4. AI use. A sector is classified as high if it ranks in the top quartile for at least two indicators and not in the bottom quartile for the remaining two, and as low if it ranks in the bottom quartile for at least two indicators and not in the top quartile for the remaining two. Sectors such as IT services, media, telecommunications, finance and scientific research and development are classified as high-intensity, while food products, textiles, wood and paper, construction and hospitality are low-intensity. Sectors falling outside these criteria are classified as medium AI-intensive. The latest observations are for 20 October 2026. |
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US firms (especially the hyperscalers building out the AI infrastructure) have been large-scale issuers of euro-denominated bonds (reverse Yankees). So far, the available data show that purchases by European investors of euro-denominated bonds issued by US firms have increased alongside a decline in their purchases of US Treasury bonds (Chart 9a).[8] European investors also purchase the dollar bonds issued by US hyperscalers.
The AI boom has also led to large initial public offerings (IPOs), including the SpaceX IPO in the second quarter of 2026. In this context, euro area investors have stepped up their acquisitions of US equities, and at the same time they have lowered their purchases of other foreign equities (Chart 9b). Overall, these developments, together with analysis of credit spreads and the book-cover ratios of euro area corporate issuers and credit spreads, suggest only limited crowding-out up to now.[9] See Furtuna, O., Duquerroy, A., Rahmouni-Rousseau, I. and Vaz Cruz, L. (2026), "Big tech, big debt: when US tech giants tap the euro area bond market", The ECB Blog, ECB, 31 August.
Chart 9
Absorption of US AI issuance in the euro area
a) Issuance and absorption of reverse Yankees |
b) US IPOs and euro area purchases of foreign equities |
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(average of quarterly flows in EUR billions) |
(average of quarterly flows in EUR billions) |
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Source: ECB SHSS (Securities Holdings Statistics by Sector). Notes: Reverse Yankees refer to euro-denominated bonds issued by US firms. Euro area purchases refer to the non-MFI sector. The latest observations are for the second quarter of 2026. |
Sources: ECB SHSS (Securities Holdings Statistics by Sector)and Dealogic. Notes: Euro area purchases refer to the non-MFI sector. "RoW" stands for rest of the world. The latest observations are for the second quarter of 2026. |
Finally, lending to AI-related firms has contributed substantially to aggregate credit growth. This is evident in Chart 10, which shows that the ECB Broad Intermediate Gauge (ECB-BIG) index would have indicated a tighter credit environment in the absence of AI-related lending. In response to a dedicated question in the October 2026 bank lending survey on the significance and impact of AI adoption, several banks indicated that they expect a gradual but sustained increase in loan demand to finance digital infrastructure, particularly data centres. Banks also reported that their current and prospective AI-related lending is more likely to target infrastructure providers rather than software developers or firms adopting AI, with this focus expected to become more pronounced over the coming months.
Chart 10
Effect of AI on intermediation conditions
ECB-BIG index |
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(index - higher means tighter intermediation conditions) |
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Sources: NL Analytics, PATSTAT (Patent Statistical Database), ECB, ECB projections database, Allayioti, Di Casola and Magistretti (2026) and ECB calculations. Notes: The ECB Broad Intermediation Gauge (ECB-BIG) index uses a BVAR model with mixed-frequency. Price components include lending rates and the FCI; Quantity components include credit volumes and data from the bank lending survey. Shaded areas represent the 90 per cent confidence bands. The counterfactual assumes that the share of AI patents after June 2024 remained constant, conditioning only on the AI news shock. The latest observations are for October 2026. |
I will now turn from aggregate trends to firm-level and household-level surveys on AI adoption before examining how AI is being funded by the financial system.
AI adoption
The pace of AI adoption by European firms has trended upwards since the launch of ChatGPT in late 2022. Chart 11 shows that the proportion of firms citing AI-related topics in earnings calls has expanded from about 10 per cent to about 40 per cent over this period. A similar pattern is evident in our Corporate Telephone Survey.
Chart 11
Alternative measures of AI adoption
Proportion of firms mentioning AI or related terms |
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(percentage of firms) |
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Sources: NL Analytics, Corporate Telephone Survey Team and ECB calculations. Notes: CTS (Corporate Telephone Survey) refers to the proportion of euro area firms which mentioned "AI" during the call; Earnings calls refer to the quarterly average proportion of euro area firms which mentioned "AI", "artificial intelligence", "machine learning", "large language models", "LLM", or alternatives during the earnings call. The dashed lines indicate the trend since the second quarter of 2023. The latest observations are for the second quarter of 2026. |
The earnings calls data show significant variation across sectors.[10] Ferrari, I., Gori, S., Groß, J., Schupp, F. and Steffensen, S. (2026), "Artificial intelligence and European firms: the cost of market-based financing", forthcoming in Economic Bulletin, Issue 7, ECB.
Chart 12
AI adoption across the European economy
















