HRW Briefs ICC Assembly Ahead of 24th Session

The states parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) will meet from December 1-6, 2025, in The Hague, for the annual session of the Assembly of States Parties (ASP).[1]

This year's session takes place as the court is facing recurrent threats to its independence and the critical mandate that states parties have entrusted to it. These include the United States government's imposition of escalating sanctions targeting the ICC and those supporting its work, which, if unchecked, could severely undermine the court's global mandate. US sanctions also have severe effects on human rights organizations, some of which have been directly targeted, hampering their critical work on behalf of victims of serious crimes. Russian arrest warrants against court officials and a law criminalizing cooperation with the court remain in force. The ICC has also faced a second serious cyber-attack with the purpose of espionage.

At the same time, states parties are faltering when it comes to upholding their obligations to arrest and surrender individuals wanted by the court. Four states parties took steps to leave the Rome Statute, with Hungary depositing its notification of withdrawal in June, and three Sahel countries-Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali-announcing in September their intention to withdraw.

Notwithstanding these challenges, the court continues to carry out its critical work for justice and has achieved important results over the past year. These include the arrest and surrender to the court of former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, who is now in detention in The Hague awaiting crimes against humanity charges related to the Philippines' notorious "war on drugs"; the issuance of arrest warrants against two Taliban leaders for the crime against humanity of persecution, including based on gender, in Afghanistan; and the issuance of two milestone verdicts in the Central African Republic and Darfur situations. These developments are a resounding affirmation of the ICC's critical role as a court of last resort.

Efforts to undermine the ICC's global mandate are a manifestation of a broader, concerning trend by some governments of disregard for and attacks against the global rule of law. In this perilous context, states parties have a responsibility-and the ability-to push back against this trend and protect the court they created more than 25 years ago. As recently noted by the president of the United Nations General Assembly, they "cannot remain silent; indifference will lead to a world where might makes right."

To this end, states parties should make the most of the upcoming Assembly session to stand up for the court and those who make its work possible, and show their resolve to uphold the rule of law, both in word and in action. In turn, ICC officials have the responsibility to do all they can to improve the effectiveness of the institution, following up on the recommendations of the Independent Expert Review process.

This briefing note sets out recommendations to the Assembly and states parties for the 24th Assembly session in the following priority areas: 1) defending international justice; 2) responding to non-cooperation; 3) ensuring the court has the necessary financial resources; 4) review of the crime of aggression amendments; and 5) the ongoing external investigation of alleged misconduct by the prosecutor.

On February 6, 2025, US President Donald Trump issued Executive Order 14203, which authorizes asset freezes and entry bans on ICC officials and others supporting the court's work.[2] The order makes clear that the Trump administration seeks to shield US and Israeli officials from facing charges before the ICC.

Since February, the US government has used Executive Order 14203 to impose sanctions on the ICC prosecutor, the two deputy prosecutors, six of the court's judges, the United Nations special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian Territory occupied since 1967, and three leading Palestinian human rights organizations-Al-Haq, Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights.[3] This is an outrageous abuse of US sanctioning power meant to target and sideline those who commit international crimes, not those who seek or deliver justice for the victims of those crimes.

US sanctions have serious effects on those targeted, who lose access to their assets in the United States and are denied commercial and financial dealings with "US persons," including banks and other companies. US sanctions also have a chilling effect on non-US banks and other companies outside of US jurisdiction that could themselves lose access to the US banking system if they do not support the sanctions. US persons face penalties, including fines and imprisonment, for violating sanctions.[4]

Two of the Palestinian human rights organizations that have been designated, Al-Haq and Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, recently disclosed some of the concrete, severe effects of the sanctions on their work, including: the closing of their bank accounts; the inability for US nationals to continue working with the organizations; loss of funding; reduced engagement with US-based partners; and several social media restrictions.[5]

To date, three lawsuits have been brought in US courts against Executive Order 14203 on behalf of individuals who support the work of the court, as well as one prosecutor working at the ICC. One lawsuit led to a permanent injunction of enforcement against its plaintiffs, two academics, one of whom is also a special advisor to the ICC prosecutor; meanwhile, a judge in the other, ongoing case also issued a preliminary injunction allowing the plaintiffs in that case, two human rights activists, to resume their engagement with the court. The prosecutor working at the ICC was granted a license to continue his Darfur-related work at the court and the lawsuit was withdrawn.[6]

US sanctions are adding to other ongoing efforts to undermine the ICC's work from those who fear the court's reach. In 2023 and 2024, Russian authorities issued arrest warrants against eight ICC judges and the court's prosecutor in retaliation for the court's arrest warrant against Russian President Vladimir Putin for the alleged unlawful transfer and deportation of children from occupied areas of Ukraine to Russia.[7] A 2023 Russian law criminalizing cooperation with the ICC remains in force and similar bills are under discussion in the Israeli Knesset.[8] In September 2023 and June 2025, the court was also the target of two sophisticated cyberattacks with the purpose of espionage.[9]

This is not the first time that the US government has attacked the ICC and its staff for executing their mandates.[10] But the stakes this time are particularly high because the power of US sanctions is being abused at a moment of vulnerability for the global rule of law and double standards in state support for accountability.

States parties are stepping up to defend justice and have taken actions to ensure the court can continue its critical work. More will be needed both in terms of political support and concrete measures, particularly as the risk of further sanctions-including designation of the ICC as a whole-remains.[11] These steps will ensure the court can continue to operate in full independence, without compromises to its mandate.

A. Ensuring adequate political support

Political support is an essential element of the multifaceted strategy needed to protect the ICC and those who make its critical work possible-including human rights organizations and other experts-from efforts to hamper the delivery of justice for serious crimes. This can take many forms, including public messages of support for the court and in opposition to the sanctions, and bilateral engagement with the US government registering opposition to sanctions targeting the court. Stepped up state party cooperation with the court can also serve as a valuable sign of political support.

Public messages of support for the court from states parties are particularly important. These messages-whether through individual or joint statements, social media posts, or engagement with the media-counteract pressure on the court's independence and show solidarity with victims and survivors seeking justice before the court. They are also important encouragement to continue lawful and legitimate work with the ICC, and others, that the US has designated for sanctions.

Following the issuance of Executive Order 14203, 79 states parties issued a statement reaffirming their "unwavering support" for the court, highlighting how sanctions could undermine the court's mandate, and committing to ensure the court can continue its crucial work, in addition to statements by individual states parties.[12] UN officials and human rights experts, as well as the European Union Commission and European Council presidents, spoke out in support of the court, and civil society groups around the world denounced the executive order.[13] Similarly, cross-regional groups of states parties issued important joint statements in support of the court during the 59th session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva and during the Assembly of States Parties' special session in July, in New York, both following the designations of the first four judges.[14]

On November 11, states parties used the opportunity of the annual report of the ICC president to the UN General Assembly to make statements in support of the court, both individually and jointly, the latter through both regional and cross-regional groupings.[15] Notably, a diverse, cross-regional group of 59 states parties issued a strong joint statement rejecting any threats or action taken to obstruct the court's mandate and declaring that the signatories "stand firmly with the Court, its officials and staff and all those cooperating with it, including members of civil society."[16] This is one of the few state party statements since the designation of the three Palestinian groups that explicitly mentions civil society.

Indeed, although UN human rights experts and civil society groups have responded to each designation, states parties have mostly focused on ICC officials.[17] For example, the Assembly Presidency and states parties issued statements after the designations of the two deputy prosecutors and six judges but were mostly silent following the designations of Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese and the three Palestinian civil society organizations.[18]

It is crucial that states parties recognize these sanctions as an attack not only on the ICC but on civil society. Civil society is a critical pillar of the Rome Statute system, and nongovernmental organizations play a key role in advancing justice before the ICC, often being the primary link between victims and the court. Political signals of support from governments are essential to protect the civic space necessary to animate the international justice system.

The upcoming Assembly session is an important platform for states parties and the Assembly to publicly show their support for the court and civil society. States parties should make the most of this opportunity by ensuring ministerial-level participation at the Assembly, including to deliver statements in the General Debate. This year, the General Debate is organized around the theme "Concrete Measures to Strengthen the International Criminal Court" and it aims to produce an outcome document committing to take steps to bolster the court's resilience.[19]

Of course, states parties should maintain this political support beyond the Assembly session, including in their engagement with the US government. However, it is critical for this engagement to remain principled. It should focus on expressing support for the court and registering opposition to the sanctions targeting it; it should not result in attempts to achieve "compromises" with the Trump administration that could, even indirectly, put pressure on the court's judicial and prosecutorial independence-let alone steps that would actually undermine core Rome Statute principles-including around issues of immunities and complementarity.

Finally, another critical way for states parties to show political support for the court is to visibly step up efforts to further the execution of its global mandate and the full realization of the Rome Statute system. These practical steps are more important than ever; to reinforce the value of international law, the court needs to deliver and be seen to deliver on the mandate entrusted to it by its states parties. This should include signing voluntary cooperation agreements with the court, including for the enforcement of sentences; making contributions to the Trust Fund for Victims; and adopting the necessary national legislation or other steps to implement the Rome Statute and effectively cooperate with the court, particularly when it comes to arrest operations.

B. Putting in place concrete measures

US sanctions have serious consequences for the individuals and entities designated, as noted above, their reach is far broader. To minimize risk, financial institutions often go out of their way to comply with US regulations and may preemptively refuse to deal with transactions involving the ICC, even if the designated court officials are not involved. In addition, the executive order creates apprehension and uncertainty for nongovernmental organizations and others who work closely with those targeted by sanctions.

Government action to minimize the effects of the sanctions is crucial to ensure that the ICC and others who may be targeted by the US can continue their work on behalf of justice.

The Assembly has advanced work on the concrete measures needed to ensure the court's resilience and business continuity in the face of coercive measures.[20] Many steps, including by states parties, have already been taken, but more is needed, including in the key areas of continuity of services and protection of court officials.

Concrete measures are needed to nullify the effects of potential sanctions against the ICC, its officials, and those cooperating with it. This should include the adoption or implementation of national or regional blocking statutes. The European Union and its member states, where the court's permanent premises and many of its service providers are located, have a particularly important role to play. The EU also has a unique tool it can use. The EU Blocking Statute prohibits EU entities from complying with extraterritorial sanctions programs listed in its annex.[21] The European Commission has the power to add the US sanctions targeting the ICC to its annex. However, it has yet to do so despite the multiple designations that followed the issuance of the executive order and repeated calls to do so by civil society, UN human rights experts, the EU Parliament and some EU member states.[22]

The EU Blocking Statute and similar efforts are needed in concert with other measures to limit the effects of US sanctions on the court's work and that of those cooperating with the court. Nonetheless, the EU Blocking Statute is an important, available tool and its use would send a strong signal to European service operators to avoid overcompliance with US sanctions.

In 2024, the ICC Registry prepared a concept note that was discussed in the Bureau's cooperation facilitation and welcomed by the Assembly during its last session.[23] The concept note lays out the privileges and immunities enjoyed by ICC elected officials, court staff, counsel, and persons assisting defense counsel and experts at the court, and enumerates specific actions to be taken to protect them. These include the adoption of guidelines clarifying the types of specific measures and processes to be put in place. In 2025, the Registry prepared these guidelines that were then discussed in the cooperation facilitation.[24] States parties should commit to implement the measures outlined in these guidelines and, to that end, ratify the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the ICC, if they are not already party to it. Such agreement offers broad protection against coercive measures to ICC officials and other categories of court staff and individuals working with the court.[25]

Recommendations to the Assembly and ICC states parties

• Send ministerial-level representation to participate in the thematic General Debate on concrete measures to strengthen the ICC and contribute to producing an outcome document committing to certain steps to strengthen the resilience of the court.
• In General Debate statements and all other relevant opportunities:
  • Express support for the ICC's critical work across all situations, and commit to providing the court with the consistent financial, political and practical support needed to fulfill its global mandate;
  • Call on all states to join the ICC to ensure its universal reach, welcome Ukraine as the newest state party, and urge Hungary, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali to reconsider their Rome Statute withdrawal;
  • Strongly condemn threats and attacks against the court, its officials, and those cooperating with it, including the US sanctions, and call for the swift revocation of US Executive Order 14203;
  • Commit to taking any other steps to support the execution or the court's global mandate and the full realization of the Rome Statute system. These should include:
    • Signing voluntary cooperation agreements with the court, including for the enforcement of sentences;
    • Making contributions to the Trust Fund for Victims; and
    • Adopting the necessary national legislation or other steps to implement the Rome Statute and effectively cooperate with the court, particularly when it comes to arrest operations.
  • Speak out in support of the critical work that civil society does on behalf of victims of serious crimes and call for enhanced protection of civil society organizations and human rights defenders at risk due to their advocacy for justice.
  • Commit to taking concrete actions to limit or, where possible, nullify the effects of any coercive measures, including sanctions, against the court, its officials, and those cooperating with it. EU member countries should vocally support the swift activation of the EU Blocking Statute in relation to US sanctions targeting the ICC. All states parties, that have not yet done so, should ratify the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the ICC.
• Use all available public information tools, including press comments and social media posts, to publicize support for the court's impartial and independent work across all situations in the lead up to and during the Assembly session.
• Adopt Omnibus resolution language condemning the US sanctions against court officials, UN Special Rapporteur Albanese, and the three Palestinian human rights organizations, and calling for the revocation of Executive Order 14203.

Related Human Rights Watch Materials

• "US: Trump Authorizes International Criminal Court Sanctions," Human Rights Watch news release, February 7, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/02/07/us-trump-authorizes-international-criminal-court-sanctions
• Maria Elena Vignoli, "World Responds to Trump's Targeting of International Criminal Court," commentary, Human Rights Watch dispatch, February 12, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/02/12/world-responds-trumps-targeting-international-criminal-court
• "EU Should Defend the ICC," Human Rights Watch joint news release, April 4, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/04/04/eu-should-defend-icc
• Human Rights Watch Joint Letter to the Japanese Government, "Supporting the International Criminal Court," April 23, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/04/23/joint-letter-japanese-government-supporting-international-criminal-court
• Alice Autin, "EU Foreign Ministers Should Pledge to Defend Justice," commentary, Human Rights Watch dispatch, June 19, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/06/19/eu-foreign-ministers-should-pledge-to-defend-justice
• "Strong Push Back Against US Sanctions on the International Criminal Court at UN Human Rights Council," Human Rights Watch joint statement, July 11, 2o25, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/07/11/strong-push-back-against-us-sanctions-on-the-international-criminal-court-at-un
• Agnès Callamard (Amnesty International) and Federico Borello (Human Rights Watch), "What Happened to Human Rights for Palestinians?" commentary, New York Times, October 1, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/10/01/what-happened-to-human-rights-for-palestinians

Firm respect for the court's decisions and steadfast commitment to uphold their obligations under the Rome Statute should be another pillar of state party strategies for defending the court from attacks on its independence and mandate, and reaffirming the importance of a rules-based international order. Unfortunately, in 2025 there has been a concerning trend of state party disregard for these obligations in relation to the execution of the court's arrest warrants.

Since January, three states parties have failed to arrest and surrender to the ICC individuals wanted by the court who were on their territories:

• On January 19, Italian authorities arrested Osama Elmasry Njeem, wanted by the ICC for war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed in Libya, only to then release him two days later on "procedural grounds" and send him back to Libya aboard an Italian state aircraft without informing the ICC.[26] On October 17, ICC judges found that Italy failed to comply with its cooperation obligations when it released Njeem and sent him back to Libya. At the time, the judges deferred the decision to refer the situation to the Assembly and/or the UN Security Council, asking Italy to provide any additional information on relevant domestic proceedings.[27] Italy submitted the requested information on October 31, and to date, the judges have yet to rule on the potential referral.[28]
• On April 2, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán welcomed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Budapest despite the ICC arrest warrant against him for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza.[29] On July 24, ICC judges found that Hungary failed to comply with its obligation to cooperate with the court by not arresting and surrendering Netanyahu, and referred the finding to the Assembly.[30] In accordance with the Assembly procedures relating to non-cooperation, Hungary was invited to a Bureau meeting in September to discuss the matter.[31]
• On October 9, Russian President Vladimir Putin entered Tajikistan to attend a Russia-Central Asia summit and a meeting of the Commonwealth of Independent States and did not face arrest.[32] The same happened almost a year earlier, when he visited Mongolia, which was later found in breach of its cooperation obligation.[33] The ICC judges have yet to rule on Tajikistan's failure to comply with its obligation to arrest Putin.

These instances were met with mild and inconsistent condemnation from states parties.[34] In order to prevent such breaches of statutory obligations in the future, it is critical for states parties to raise the political cost of non-cooperation both individually, in their bilateral relations with the concerned states, as well as through the Assembly as a whole. At the upcoming Assembly session, states parties should respond robustly to the finding of non-cooperation against Hungary making use of the Assembly's existing non-cooperation procedures, and prepare the groundwork to respond to a potential referral of the finding against Italy, as well as any other future ones.

The non-cooperation procedures, adopted in 2011 and amended subsequently, provide for a number of possible steps, including, when it comes to Assembly sessions, the discussion in a plenary session of action taken by the Bureau in relation to a specific finding of non-cooperation and a possible resolution containing concrete recommendations.[35] At the upcoming session, the Assembly should note the finding against Hungary, as well as other non-cooperation findings, in the Omnibus resolution; this should include the Assembly's commitment to enforcing such findings. During the session, the Bureau should appoint-or the Assembly should mandate the Bureau to appoint-a facilitator to consult states parties, the court, and civil society on concrete recommendations to ensure enforcement of the finding of non-cooperation against Hungary. The facilitator should report back to the Bureau, the Assembly, and states parties within the first quarter of 2026.

Last year the Assembly decided to include a standing agenda item for its future sessions for the "the consideration of non-cooperation issues arising during the intersessional period."[36] States parties should make the most of the first of such sessions by ensuring it includes a discussion on their responsibility to enforce judicial findings of non-cooperation and what that should look like. In particular, it will be important for states parties during this plenary to:

• Acknowledge the poor track record of the Assembly and states parties to adequately respond to judicial findings of non-cooperation. The Assembly has mostly responded to these findings by noting them and the impact of non-cooperation on the court's effective functioning in the Omnibus resolution.[37]
• Recall and express concerns for all of the instances of non-cooperation that occurred over the past year; and
• Highlight concrete steps that could be taken by states parties individually and by the Assembly as a whole to prevent and respond to non-cooperation.

Unfortunately, while the current non-cooperation procedures outline a clear, if only permissive, process for responding to formal findings of non-cooperation, they stop short of prescribing specific steps the Assembly can take collectively. While making full use of the current procedures, states parties should discuss further review and possible revisions, including the eventual identification of such steps, including steps that could be taken by states on a bilateral basis. At the upcoming Assembly session, the non-cooperation focal points should be mandated to carry out such review and report to the next Assembly session.

In addition to the failures by Italy, Hungary, and Tajikistan to arrest and surrender to the court ICC fugitives who were on their territories, since the end of last year, a number of government officials of ICC states parties, mostly European, have issued official statements and made remarks to the media casting doubt as to whether their governments would fulfill their obligations to arrest certain ICC fugitives, or directly saying that they would not.[38] Ambivalent or even negative signals about the validity of ICC decisions erode the court's legitimacy and display regrettable selectivity, sending the message that the rule of law is for some, but not all.

States parties should use the upcoming Assembly session as an opportunity to counter this negative narrative and commit to execute all pending ICC arrest warrants, regardless of whom they target.

Recommendations to the Assembly and ICC states parties

• In General Debate statements:
  • Condemn instances of non-cooperation, and commit to providing the court with the practical support it needs to fulfill its mandate across situations, including through the execution of all pending arrest warrants, regardless of whom they target; and
  • Commit to enforcing judicial findings of non-cooperation in the strongest possible terms, collectively, through the Assembly and responding to these findings in bilateral relationships with the state party concerned.
• Use the non-cooperation plenary to discuss the issue of enforcement of findings of non-cooperation, including by:
  • Acknowledging the poor track record of the Assembly and states parties to adequately respond to judicial findings of non-cooperation;
  • Recalling and expressing concern for all the instances of non-cooperation that occurred over the past year; and
  • Highlighting what concrete steps could be taken by states parties individually, and by the Assembly as a whole, to prevent and respond to non-cooperation.
• Include language in the Omnibus resolution mandating the non-cooperation focal points to further review the non-cooperation procedures in light of lessons learned to date, and recommend possible revisions, including the eventual identification of concrete steps that can be taken by the Assembly.
• Mandate the Bureau to appoint a facilitator to consult states parties, the court, and civil society on concrete recommendations for both the Assembly and states parties to enforce the non-cooperation finding against Hungary. The facilitator should report back to the Bureau, the Assembly, and states parties within the first quarter of 2026.

Recommendations to the Bureau of the Assembly

• Report to the Assembly on actions taken to date to respond to the judicial findings on non-cooperation before the Assembly and provide concrete recommendations on the matter.
• Appoint a facilitator to consult states parties, the court, and civil society on concrete recommendations for both the Assembly and states parties to enforce the non-cooperation finding against Hungary. The facilitator should report back to the Bureau, Assembly, and states parties within the first quarter of 2026.

Related Human Rights Watch Materials

• Alice Autin, "Poland Sends Wrong Signal on Global Justice," commentary, Human Rights Watch dispatch, January 15, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/01/15/poland-sends-wrong-signal-global-justice
• Claudio Francavilla, "From Israel to Libya, Italy is Protecting Alleged War Criminals," commentary, Human Rights Watch dispatch, January 29, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/01/29/israel-libya-italy-protecting-alleged-war-criminals
• "Hungary: Arrest, Don't Welcome ICC Fugitive Netanyahu," Human Rights Watch news release, April 1, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/04/01/hungary-arrest-dont-welcome-icc-fugitive-netanyahu
• "EU Should Defend the ICC," Human Rights Watch joint news release, April 4, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/04/04/eu-should-defend-icc
• "Tajikistan: Arrest Putin," Human Rights Watch news release, October 8, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/10/08/tajikistan-arrest-putin

ICC states parties will decide the court's budget for the coming year during this Assembly session. For 2026, excluding payment on the host state loan, the ICC has requested €193.96 million or an increase of 1.1 percent above its €191.89 million budget approved for 2025.[39] The Committee on Budget and Finance (CBF), a technical body charged with reviewing the court's proposed annual budget and making relevant recommendations to the Assembly, has recommended cuts to the court's proposal. If adopted, these would leave the court's budget at €193.26 million, or an increase of 0.7 percent from last year.[40]

In 2022, 2023, and 2024, the court asked for substantial increases to its annual budget, in recognition of the significant uptick in its workload and the challenging environment in which it is operating.[41] However, states parties responded to these proposals with nominal increases that were much lower than what the court requested-and lower than what the CBF recommended-and that, in reality, barely covered costs associated with inflation.[42]

The court's budget request for 2026 is conservative; it focuses primarily on the institution's resilience, its business continuity, and risk mitigation.[43] In particular, the court acknowledges that sanctions imposed by the US government against certain court officials are having a financial impact and is requesting resources to mitigate operational, financial, and cybersecurity risks to preserve the court's ability to carry out its mandate in full independence and impartiality.[44]

An important factor to consider when looking at the environment the court will be operating in-and the costs associated with it-is also the financial pressure faced by many elements of the broad system for international justice. This includes the prospect of cuts in funding to other critical elements of the system, such as United Nations activities and support to nongovernmental organizations, on which the ICC depends.

Providing the court with the resources it needs in its regular budget to build the necessary resilience, while also continuing to robustly carry out its global mandate, is a critical element of the strategy to protect the ICC from threats and attacks aimed at undermining its independence.

Another essential tool to ensure the court's resilience is the Contingency Fund. At the last session, the Assembly decided to allow the Contingency Fund to be exceptionally used to cover additional costs related to sanctions-among others-and that the fund would be replenished with the cash surplus for 2023.[45] To date, the court has notified the CBF twice in 2025 that it needed to access the Contingency Fund, once in relation to the situation in the Philippines, and once "in light of international developments affecting the Court's activities."[46]

In its last report to the Assembly, the CBF acknowledged the current environmental uncertainty and recommended that the notional level of the Contingency Fund be raised to its original level of €10 million. It also recommended that the Assembly renew the exceptional access to the fund that was granted to the court for 2025.[47] The CBF further reiterated its view that the Assembly should consider a mechanism for the automatic replenishment of the Contingency Fund through assessed contributions. The Assembly should implement these recommendations with a view to ensuring the court has the necessary flexibility to continue executing its mandate in an extremely uncertain operational environment.

Recommendations to the Assembly and ICC states parties

• Scrutinize the Committee on Budget and Finance's recommendations and adopt a 2026 budget that comes as close as possible to ensuring the effective implementation of the court's mandate across all situations and ensures the court's business continuity.
• Raise the notional level of the Contingency Fund to €10 million.
• Renew for 2026 the exceptional access to the Contingency Fund that was granted to the court for 2025.
• Establish a mechanism of automatic replenishment of the Contingency Fund through assessed contributions.

Related Human Rights Watch Materials

• "Human Rights Watch's Statement to the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute Committee on Budget and Finance," September 3, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/09/03/human-rights-watchs-statement-to-the-assembly-of-states-parties-to-the-rome-statute

On July 7-9, 2025, the Assembly of States Parties met in New York for a special session on the review of the amendments on the crime of aggression.[48] Following difficult negotiations, the Assembly decided to convene another special session in 2029, establish a dedicated subgroup of the Bureau's Working Group on Amendments on the crime of aggression, and schedule an intersessional stocktaking meeting in 2027.[49]

Human Rights Watch calls on states parties to eliminate double standards in the treatment of the crime of aggression under the Rome Statute, and work toward the ratification of the amendments to article 15 bis proposed by Costa Rica, Germany, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, and Vanuatu.[50] The proposed amendments aim to ensure that, as with other crimes in article 5 of the Rome Statute, the ICC can exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression pursuant to a state referral or the prosecutor acting proprio motu, when committed by state party nationals or on the territory of states parties. This would eliminate the current asymmetry between the core crimes in the treaty, as amended, and the resulting potentially selective application of the Rome Statute.

On November 11, 2024, the Assembly president announced that she was seeking an external investigation into allegations of sexual misconduct against the ICC prosecutor, after an initial inquiry by the court's Independent Oversight Mechanism was closed.[51] The investigation is being carried out by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). On May 16, 2025, the prosecutor decided to take leave until the end of the OIOS investigation and the two deputy prosecutors took temporary charge of the management of the office.[52] On June 24, the ASP president announced that, once finalized, the OIOS report-which will have a fact-finding nature-will be assigned to an external panel of judicial experts who will provide the Bureau, via the ASP president, with a legal characterization of the report to inform next steps.[53]

The OIOS investigation is ongoing, more than a year after it was first announced. While critically important, the investigation has taken far longer than anticipated, leaving the court vulnerable at a time of unprecedented external pressure. The Bureau and Assembly should be prepared to swiftly and adequately respond to the outcome of the investigation, avoiding politicization of this process, and respecting the rights of all those involved.

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[1] The Assembly of States Parties (ASP) is the management oversight and legislative body of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and it is composed of representatives of the countries that have ratified the Rome Statute, the court's founding treaty. See "Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute," accessed November 18, 2025, https://asp.icc-cpi.int/.

[2] The White House, "Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court," February 6, 2025, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/imposing-sanctions-on-the-international-criminal-court/ (accessed November 18, 2025).