Thank you Chair,
From the outset, the UK would like to make clear its position on inaccuracies in one of the documents referred to in the provisional agenda, namely GOV/2024/19. The UK does not recognise the facility as described in that document and we restate the UK's position, in line with UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/ES-11/4, plus a total of four Board of Governors Resolutions and one IAEA General Conference resolution, that Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is a Ukrainian plant. We call for the urgent withdrawal of all unauthorised military and other personnel from Ukraine's ZNPP and for the plant to be returned to the full control of the competent Ukrainian authorities.
Chair
We were extremely concerned to read the DG's 7th April report of drone strikes hitting the site of ZNPP, as well as reports from the IAEA team on the ground that they had heard explosions and rifle fire on the site and several rounds of outgoing artillery fire from near the Plant. Thankfully, the DG confirmed that there were no indications of damage to critical nuclear safety and security systems at the site, but as the DG said in his most recent report, these events add to deepening concern about the already highly precarious nuclear safety and security situation at Europe's largest nuclear power plant and provide a "stark reminder" of the persistent threats faced by nuclear facilities during armed conflict.
The UK shares these concerns and echoes the Director General's appeal to abstain from any action which could violate the five concrete principles he set out at the UN Security Council last May. Everything possible must be done to reduce the risk of a nuclear incident, at ZNPP and across Ukraine.
We thank the ISAMZ team for their work at ZNPP and their resilience under such challenging circumstances. Without them, we have no independent source of information on the situation at the plant. It remains essential that the team is granted the access it needs across the site in order to monitor the nuclear safety and security situation and to spot risks.
Chair,
Since the last meeting of the Board in March, there have been 6 IAEA updates on the situation in Ukraine. These updates have reported a number of serious concerns, including:
- loss of ZNPP's connection to its last remaining main power line for 5 hours on 22 March, and to its sole remaining 330 kilovolt line on 4 April.
- A loss of power at the Neutron Source installation in Kharkiv on two occasions in March and April as a result of shelling;
- A loss of the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant's connection to one 750 kV and one 330 kV power line;
- And the frequent deployment of air raid alarms at other nuclear sites in Ukraine. We note, for example, the IAEA team at Khmelnytskyy NPP needing to take shelter four times in March, putting the operating staff there under immense pressure.
Chair,
The risks to nuclear safety we are discussing today are serious. At this Board we have raised serious nuclear safety concerns for over two years. We would not have to do so if it were not for Russia's illegal invitation of Ukraine, and their seizure and control of ZNPP.
Thank you Chair
