Mexico stands at a critical security crossroads following the confirmed death of Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, known as El Mencho, the founder and leader of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel.
The military operation, supported by key U.S. intelligence, has triggered a wave of "Code Red" violence across Puerto Vallarta, turning the popular tourist hub into a landscape of burning vehicles and "narcoblockades." This development marks a pivotal shift in bilateral security relations and raises urgent questions about the potential for cartel fragmentation and the future of stability in western Mexico, according to a University of Michigan expert.
Edgar Franco-Vivanco is an assistant professor of political science focusing on Latin American politics, historical political economy, criminal violence and criminal governance. He discusses the current situation in Mexico.
With El Mencho confirmed dead, do you expect the Jalisco Cartel to remain a unified 'corporate' entity, or will it splinter into the kind of warring factions we saw after the fall of the Sinaloa Cartel?
Historically, the decapitation of criminal organizations is associated with spikes in violence, as lieutenants compete for control. At present, there is no obvious heir to El Mencho, which increases the risk of internal struggles. That said, the Jalisco Cartel is not a traditional hierarchical cartel. It has developed a complex structure that resembles a corporation, with a semi-federalized system of franchises. This organizational flexibility may allow it to absorb leadership shocks more effectively than vertically integrated cartels.
Three scenarios are plausible: 1) the corporate structure persists under decentralized coordination; 2) the organization rapidly coalesces around a new leader; or 3) a prolonged war of succession unfolds. The probability of each scenario depends in part on the government's strategy. A sustained effort to neutralize key lieutenants and contain emerging rivals could accelerate fragmentation. If this strategy is bundled with targeted financial operations, then this could successfully destabilize the cartel.
The U.S. provided the critical intelligence for this operation. Does this signal a new era of intervention by proxy where the U.S. picks the targets and the Mexican military carries out the hits?
There is a long history of security cooperation between the United States and Mexico in combating organized crime. For decades, the DEA and other U.S. agencies have provided intelligence that facilitated high-profile arrests and seizures. This dynamic was partially disrupted during the López Obrador administration, which recalibrated cooperation and limited certain forms of engagement.
What we are seeing now appears less like a novel form of intervention by proxy and more like a reversion to established patterns: U.S. intelligence support combined with Mexican operational execution. One difference is rhetorical transparency. The current U.S. administration has been more explicit about the pressure it exerts. Structurally, however, Mexico lacks the intelligence, technological and financial monitoring capacity to confront transnational organized crime alone. Effective enforcement requires bilateral coordination, particularly in intelligence sharing, arms trafficking controls and financial surveillance.
The Jalisco Cartel responded to the killing with immediate, nationwide roadblocks. Is this a show of strength to the public or a desperate attempt to force the government into a ceasefire?
The coordinated wave of "narcoblockades"-reportedly more than 200 incidents across roughly 20 of Mexico's 32 states-constitutes a clear display of organizational capacity. The scale and simultaneity of these actions suggest that the Jalisco Cartel retains significant territorial reach and command-and-control coordination.
At the same time, such actions can serve dual purposes: signaling strength to rivals and the state while also deterring internal defection during a moment of leadership uncertainty. The coming months will test the Mexican government's ability to contain violence, prevent territorial opportunism by rivals, and degrade the cartel's operational infrastructure without triggering wider fragmentation.
Does removing El Mencho actually reduce the flow of fentanyl or does it simply create a more violent, decentralized market that is harder for both governments to track?
The killing of El Mencho, by itself, is unlikely to reduce fentanyl flows in any sustained way. Fentanyl production is highly profitable, relatively low-cost, and adaptable to decentralized manufacturing and distribution. As long as demand persists in the United States and precursor chemicals remain accessible, supply chains are likely to reconstitute.
What is more plausible is organizational restructuring. Leadership shocks often generate temporary volatility and may push groups to intensify alternative revenue streams-extortion, fuel theft and money laundering-to stabilize cash flow during uncertainty. Fragmentation can also produce a more competitive and violent market that is harder for authorities to monitor and disrupt.
Puerto Vallarta has had a strong cartel stronghold. Now that the city is under Code Red with burning vehicles and airport shutdowns, has the cartel's model of keeping its home base peaceful permanently collapsed?
The recent escalation appears to be an immediate retaliatory response to El Mencho's killing rather than definitive evidence that the cartel's governance model has collapsed. Sustained, high-intensity violence in core territories is typically "bad for business," particularly in tourism-dependent regions.
If violence persists, it is more likely to concentrate in contested territories-such as parts of Guanajuato, where the cartel has clashed with the Santa Rosa de Lima cartel-rather than in consolidated home bases.
A potential risk factor is the upcoming World Cup matches in Guadalajara. High-visibility international events increase reputational stakes for the Mexican government. While direct confrontation during such events is not inevitable, the symbolic and political incentives for both state and non-state actors intensify during these periods.
