HRW Urges Comprehensive Justice Plan for Syria

Following the overthrow of the government of Bashar al-Assad, ending over 60 years of Baath party rule in Syria, the country's authorities have an unprecedented opportunity to break with decades of impunity for serious abuses amounting to international crimes. A better future for human rights protection in Syria requires holistically addressing abuses by the former government and other parties to the 2011-2024 conflict. Syrians inside and outside of the country have been relentless in demanding truth, justice, and redress, before and since the fall of the Assad government.

Syria's transitional authorities are obligated under international law to investigate and prosecute those responsible for human rights abuses amounting to serious international crimes.[1] Ensuring justice and accountability for past abuses is essential to upholding the rights of victims, survivors, and their families, and is also a crucial tool to stabilize post conflict countries and end impunity-fueled cycles of violence.[2]

Syrian authorities have signaled their intention to advance accountability for serious crimes, albeit only those committed by the former government, with explicit references to transitional justice in Syria's constitutional declaration and the establishment of two domestic commissions dealing with relevant abuses. They have welcomed a case previously filed by the Netherlands and Canada before the United Nations' top court, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), against the former government for violations of the Convention against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention against Torture).[3] Before the UN Human Rights Council and the UN General Assembly, they have committed to "pursue justice and combat impunity," vowing a "positive and open engagement with" international monitors and UN accountability mechanisms, and for the "process [forward] to be carried out with careful deliberation and the participation of all parties, especially victims and survivors."[4]

These commitments are an important start, but they will need to be followed by concrete actions to advance justice through international efforts and domestically for victims of all perpetrators.

The primary responsibility for pursuing accountability for serious international crimes lies with national authorities. National trials could mark a turning point in uncovering and providing accountability for Syria's legacy of atrocities. Indeed, when feasible, criminal accountability pursued as close as possible to where the crimes were committed may have a greater direct impact on communities most affected by the crimes. But domestic prosecutions of atrocities are not always possible due to a lack of capacity, political will, or both. As Syria and its international partners for justice move forward, clear-eyed assessments of prospects for independent and impartial justice should guide policy choices.

Justice can be pursued and achieved through a wide range of options. Past experience shows that accountability mechanisms may vary greatly from one situation to another; for example, with respect to mandate, jurisdiction, composition, relationship between international and domestic systems, basis of authority, and sourcing of funding, among other factors.[5] Accordingly, there is no "one-size-fits-all" solution, and much depends on the particularities of each context. Still, lessons learned from past experiences, in particular those from accountability efforts in the Middle East and North Africa region, could provide a valuable source of information-including to anticipate challenges-regarding justice options that will best fit the Syrian context and specific needs of victims and survivors. Human rights standards, however, should govern all justice efforts, including the right to a fair trial, independence of the judiciary, freedom from arbitrary detention, and the obligations on all authorities to ensure accountability for international crimes, including torture and war crimes.

While there are many challenges ahead, Syrian and international nongovernmental groups, together with the support of other countries, including those in which judicial authorities have pursued domestic cases addressing crimes in Syria, as well as international organizations have built a strong foundation for what comes next.

This briefing note draws on Human Rights Watch's longstanding documentation of serious crimes in Syria and its advocacy and monitoring of justice efforts to hold perpetrators of these crimes to account, along with its experience in other countries. The note outlines accountability efforts to date, including new developments since the transitional authorities came to power. It then examines key challenges that are likely to face justice in the new Syria, where possible, drawing lessons from other contexts to outline initial practical steps and recommendations. The response will likely involve a multi-tiered, cross-cutting approach including UN and other international mechanisms and courts, prosecutions by domestic courts in Syria, and prosecutions elsewhere under the principle of universal jurisdiction or other forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction. If pursued together, these efforts could provide the long-denied hope that those responsible for Syria's atrocities, including at senior levels, will one day be held to account through fair trials.

This briefing note is also based on interviews with Syrian and international civil society and victims' groups representatives conducted between January and August 2025, alongside a number of civil society convenings and written recommendations. This research shows that after the fall of the Assad government, the need for meaningful, comprehensive and Syrian-led justice is clear, but the path to achieve it is by no means straightforward and will require continuing commitment and political will.

The briefing note focuses on steps to realize individual criminal accountability through fair and independent trials. This is just one key element necessary to realize the rights of Syrians. Transitional justice efforts are commonly understood to include truth, justice, reparation, memorialization, and guarantees of non-recurrence.[6] Specific institutions should be developed to cater to the other justice needs of victims and survivors, including addressing the continuing impact of crimes such as enforced disappearances.[7] More generally, any criminal or transitional justice efforts will need to include broader rule of law reforms to ensure Syria's future is built on strong human rights principles and that any efforts pertaining to criminal justice for serious international crimes is carried out in a manner compatible with international human rights standards.

Abuses by the Assad Government, Affiliated Militias, and Allies

Following anti-government protests in March 2011, the then-Syrian authorities' violent crackdown against protesters developed into an entrenched and prolonged armed conflict.[8] The widespread fighting, abuses, and war crimes led to a dire humanitarian situation with millions displaced internally or seeking refuge abroad. The Syrian government committed a large number of war crimes and crimes against humanity during the conflict. It conducted dozens of chemical weapons attacks as part of a broader widespread and systematic policy, sometimes directly targeting the civilian population.[9] Human Rights Watch, along with others, extensively documented and found, in 2018, that the Syrian government was responsible for the majority of the 85 confirmed chemical attacks that occurred between 2013 and 2018.[10] The government also conducted deliberate and indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, including hospital and schools, withheld humanitarian aid, and forcibly displaced Syrians in contravention of international law.[11] Between 2011 and December 2024, Syrian government forces and their allies used antipersonnel landmines, cluster munitions, and other explosive weapons extensively. Contamination from landmines and explosive remnants of war across Syria poses fatal risks to civilians returning home to urban and rural areas.[12]

Russia was a consistent ally of the Assad government, providing overt political support and blocking international accountability efforts. Russia was also a party to the conflict and participated in the Syrian government's aerial assault on civilian infrastructure, using prohibited weapons including incendiary weapons, and repeatedly denied Syria's use of chemical weapons.[13] Iran also supported Syria's National Defense Forces, paramilitary groups and Hezbollah. The UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) found that the paramilitary groups and Hezbollah, along with a number of pro-Assad armed groups were responsible for gross violations including prolonged sieges, extrajudicial executions, and unlawful forced displacement.[14]

During the 13-year conflict, government forces arbitrarily detained, forcibly disappeared, and tortured tens of thousands of peaceful protesters, activists, aid workers, doctors, and others. The worst abuse and torture took place in an extensive network of detention facilities run by the Syrian government's various intelligence agencies.[15] Based on information from former detainees and defectors, Human Rights Watch previously identified the locations, agencies responsible, torture methods, and in many cases, the commanders who were in charge of detention facilities run by Syrian intelligence agencies across the country where torture has been documented. The systematic patterns of ill-treatment and torture that Human Rights Watch documented point to a state policy of torture and ill-treatment and therefore constitute a crime against humanity. Syrian forces used widespread and systematic sexual violence against women, men, girls, and boys in house raids, checkpoints, and in detention centers.[16]

Abuses by Non-state Armed Groups Opposing the Government and Allies

During the conflict, multiple non-state armed groups opposed to the former government committed serious violations, some of which amounted to war crimes and crimes against humanity. As documented by the UN Commission of Inquiry, the extremist armed group Islamic State (ISIS) committed a broad range of international crimes in Syria. National courts in third states have convicted ISIS-affiliated individuals on charges, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.[17] Among the war crimes committed by anti-government armed groups were deliberate and indiscriminate attacks against civilians, abducting and arbitrarily detaining activists, using excessive force to stifle protests, and interfering with aid delivery.[18]

Hay'et Tahrir al-Sham, formerly Jabhat al-Nusra, an armed group previously linked to Al-Qaeda and which was founded and led by Syria's now transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa, arbitrarily arrested scores of civilians in areas under its control in Idlib, Hama, and Aleppo governorates, sometimes acting together with affiliated groups.[19] ISIS also systematically targeted and abducted civilians, carried out summary executions, recruited child soldiers, and imposed harsh, discriminatory rules on women and girls.[20] According to the UN Commission of Inquiry, ISIS committed various international crimes against the Yezidi religious group, including of sexually enslaving Yezidi women and girls.[21] A number of investigations have confirmed that ISIS also used chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq.[22] ISIS and other extremist groups conducted indiscriminate attacks on Damascus and other areas of Syria, killing and injuring hundreds of civilians.[23] ISIS also used antipersonnel mines, killing and injuring hundreds of civilians, including dozens of children, in Manbij, in northern Syria.[24]

Human Rights Watch has also documented Türkiye's responsibility for serious abuses and potential war crimes committed by members of its own forces and local armed groups it supports in Turkish-occupied territories of northern Syria.[25] Türkiye and factions of the Syrian National Army (SNA)-a coalition of armed groups now formally integrated into the Damascus-led national armed forces though many remain sponsored and funded by Türkiye-indiscriminately shelled civilian structures and systematically pillaged private property, arrested hundreds of individuals, and carried out summary executions.[26] In cases documented by the UN Commission of Inquiry, Human Rights Watch, and other human rights groups Kurds have overwhelmingly borne the brunt of these abuses, but SNA groups also targeted Arabs and others perceived to have close ties with the Syrian Democratic Forces, the military wing of the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration for North and East Syria.

Abuses since December 2024

Since the fall of the Assad government, Human Rights Watch and others have continued to document violations and abuses in Syria, some of which may amount to serious international crimes. Türkiye-backed SNA factions continued to detain, torture, and extort civilians in northern Syria, even after announcing their integration into state security forces.[27] Since December, government security forces and affiliated armed groups have carried out serious abuses.

Human Rights Watch documented widespread abuses by government forces, government-aligned armed groups, and armed volunteers, including summary executions, deliberate destruction of property, and abuse of detainees targeting people on the basis of identity, most starkly during the March 2025 massacres targeting Alawi Syrians but also in July 2025, in Sweida, targeting Druze Syrians. A recent Human Rights Watch, Syrians for Truth and Justice, and Syrian Archive joint investigation reported that the March abuses unfolded within the framework of a centrally coordinated military operation directed by the Defense Ministry, whose officials continued to coordinate deployments even after the mass killings became public. The government has promised accountability for the violence, but it has provided little transparency on whether its investigation has examined the role of senior military or civilian leaders, or what steps it may take to hold those with command authority to account.[28]

In July, nine days of armed clashes and serious abuses in Syria's southern Sweida governorate triggered a dire humanitarian crisis.[29] The fighting between local Druze-led and Bedouin armed groups, exacerbated by the manner of the Syrian government's intervention and Israeli airstrikes, caused widespread disruptions to electricity, water, and health care, and ignited identity-based hate speech and the risk of reprisals against Druze communities across the country.

In the years preceding the Assad government's fall, neither Syrian authorities nor other parties to the conflict took any steps to acknowledge, cease, or address violations and abuses, entrenching a climate of impunity that fueled further atrocities.[30] In spite of years of extensive reporting-by UN bodies and independent nongovernmental organizations including Human Rights Watch-which found that crimes in Syria's detention facilities amounted to crimes against humanity, the Syrian government consistently denied torture allegations.[31] Far from bringing accountability, the national judicial system was used to oppress the population and hide the government's crimes.[32] At the international level, justice efforts were hindered by the Russian government's support for the Assad government (see below).

Survivors, victims' groups and Syrian civil society organizations led efforts to focus international attention on human rights abuses and violations in Syria and insisted on moving towards justice for abuses and violations amounting to international crimes, despite these obstacles. With justice denied at home, Syrians have been at the forefront of accountability initiatives in various foreign and international fora, navigating political blockages through innovative solutions and the creation of new justice avenues. The result is an interconnected series of justice-related efforts including UN fact-finding instruments and international investigative mechanisms, national prosecutions under the principle of universal jurisdiction in third states and, as mentioned above, a case before the International Court of Justice for Syria's state responsibility for violations of the international Convention against Torture.[33] Syrian civil society groups have also documented alleged crimes with a view toward the potential use of this documentation as evidence in future court proceedings.[34] These efforts, in some instances, have already delivered a measure of justice, and taken together, provide the foundation for comprehensive accountability initiatives in the future.

A. Accountability Efforts before December 2024

International Criminal Court

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is an independent judicial institution tasked with delivering justice to victims of serious international crimes as a court of last resort, stepping in only where national authorities do not conduct genuine proceedings. The ICC has not had jurisdiction over the crimes committed in Syria from 2011 onwards. Syria is not a member of the ICC's founding treaty, the Rome Statute, nor has it accepted the court's jurisdiction, limiting options for justice before the court.[35] The UN Security Council can refer a situation for investigation to the ICC even where crimes occur outside of an ICC state party, but in 2014, Russia and China vetoed a Security Council resolution, supported by 65 countries from all regions, that would have referred the situation in Syria to the court's prosecutor.[36]

International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism

In response to UN Security Council deadlock on ICC jurisdiction over Syria, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in 2016 that established an unprecedented entity: the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for Syria (IIIM).[37] The mechanism is mandated to collect, preserve, and analyze potential evidence for use in courts that have jurisdiction over serious crimes in Syria, now or in the future. Significantly, the IIIM conducts analytical work, which includes mapping patterns of crimes, structures of power, and preparing files on specific actors, all with the aim of facilitating criminal proceedings against individuals.[38] For example, in 2024, the IIIM published a detailed report analyzing the commission of torture and abuses across more than 100 detention facilities in Syria.[39] At the time of writing, and based on nearly a decade of work, the IIIM has built a central repository and analysis system of information and evidence to support prosecutors and courts across different countries, and has supported 217 criminal cases and investigations resulting in 16 convictions in 5 countries.[40]

UN Commission of Inquiry

In 2011, the UN Human Rights Council established an Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (COI) to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law in the country since March 2011. The commission's mandate, renewed on a yearly basis, explicitly encompasses contributions to accountability efforts, including "establishing the facts and circumstances that may amount to [international law] violations and of the crimes perpetrated and, where possible, identify[ing] those responsible with a view of ensuring that perpetrators of violations, including those that may constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes, are held accountable." The commission regularly reports to the UN Human Rights Council on its findings.[41] At the time of writing, the commission has published over 30 reports and multiple thematic policy briefs.[42] The commission has found that the Assad government committed war crimes and crimes against humanity including extermination, murder, rape and sexual violence, torture, imprisonment, and enforced disappearance. It also documented crimes by other states and non-state parties to the conflict, including summary executions, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearance, torture, and sexual violence. The commission's reports also underlined the impact of the conflict on civilians, including children, women and girls, as well as on civilian infrastructure, in particular the devastation of medical and educational infrastructure and cultural heritage sites. The commission has also established confidential lists of alleged perpetrators of violations and crimes committed in Syria by all parties to the conflict.[43]

Over the years, the commission paired its public reporting of the crimes with assessments of the ability and capacity of the Syrian authorities to investigate and prosecute those crimes. It made a number of recommendations relating to legislative and judicial reforms in Syria necessary to hold perpetrators accountable as well as steps for the international community to support justice outside of Syria, and outlined steps necessary for evidence preservation as well as cooperation with "international and national human rights entities."[44] In a 2024 report, it outlined a number of recommendations to advance accountability, and published a specific paper on accountability for ISIS's crimes.[45]

Although separate from it, the COI has benefitted from technical and administrative support from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which has also supported transitional justice efforts in Syria.[46]

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

In 2013, Syria signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention), joining the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and committing to never use chemical weapons, and "never under any circumstances to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone."[47] A number of specific investigative mechanisms have since been set up to document Syria's compliance-or lack thereof-with its obligations under the convention. The OPCW Fact-Finding Mission, tasked to investigate the use of such weapons in Syria since 2014, concluded that they were used or likely used in 20 instances. On the basis of these findings, the UN Security Council established an OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) to collect and analyze evidence aimed at identifying the perpetrators of chemical weapons attacks in Syria. The JIM released seven reports in which it concluded that the Syrian government and ISIS were involved in the use of chemicals as weapons against the Syrian population.[48] After the JIM's mandate expired in November 2017, following another Russian veto at the UN Security Council, the OPCW established its own Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) to continue this work. The IIT confirmed that the Syrian Arab Republic's armed forces were responsible for the use of chemical weapons on multiple occasions during the Syrian conflict.[49]

Syrian and international human rights groups have worked with international legal experts to establish a standalone tribunal to prosecute the use of chemical weapons. If this initiative moves forward, the proposed, treaty-based court could prosecute alleged users of banned toxic agents worldwide in situations "where there is no recourse to existing judicial criminal fora."[50]

Independent Institution on Missing Persons

Following persistent advocacy from Syrian families and civil society groups, in June 2023, the UN General Assembly established a mechanism to address the fate of the over 100,000 missing persons in Syria.[51] The Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic (IIMP) has a humanitarian and truth-seeking mandate: it is tasked with determining what happened to Syria's missing, and offering psychological, legal, and practical assistance to survivors and families affected by enforced disappearances, conflicts, migration, or detention. It aims to support families' right to know the truth about their missing relatives, regardless of their nationality, political affiliation, or the reasons for or timing of their going missing.[52] The IIMP has started to collect information to investigate cases and outlined specific lines of inquiry, including on missing children and those forcibly disappeared by the former government.[53] It is working to implement a search plan in coordination with relevant actors and families, deliver context analysis to determine the circumstances in which people went missing, and conduct preliminary investigations and search activities, including by using forensic identification methods. The IIMP will also train professionals across relevant sectors in Syria and will provide a referral system to provide psychosocial support, health care services, and legal assistance-in Syria and abroad-for affected families.

Universal Jurisdiction

Criminal justice authorities in several European countries and in the US, including following legal complaints filed by nongovernmental groups on behalf of victims, have been investigating people alleged to have committed serious crimes in Syria. A key tool in these cases has been the use of the legal principle of universal jurisdiction. This principle allows for the investigation and prosecution of serious crimes no matter where they were committed and regardless of the nationality of the suspects or victims. German, French, and Swedish specialized prosecutors have been carrying out broad, "structural" investigations into crimes committed during the Syrian armed conflict.[54] Rather than looking at individual conduct, for which certain countries would need to identify a perpetrator present on their territory, structural investigations examine patterns of violations which can then be linked to specific cases for individual prosecutions. Efforts have led to landmark verdicts against former Syrian government officials and agents as well as members of non-state armed groups such as ISIS and Jaysh al-Islam.[55] The IIIM and UN Commission of Inquiry have supported these efforts by sharing information and evidence with national judicial authorities. The European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) has facilitated and advanced the coordination of countries working on universal jurisdiction in Europe.[56]

International Court of Justice

In 2020, the Netherlands, later joined by Canada, announced its intention to hold the Syrian government accountable under the Convention against Torture.[57] Following required negotiation and arbitration with the former Syrian government, and with no changes to the situation, the Netherlands and Canada filed a case at the International Court of Justice in 2023. The Netherlands and Canada alleged that Syria is violating the convention, citing unlawful treatment of detainees, inhumane detention conditions, enforced disappearances, sexual and gender-based violence, violence against children, and the use of chemical weapons.[58] The case is not a criminal proceeding against individuals but seeks a legal determination of state responsibility for torture. In November 2023, the ICJ provisionally ordered Syria to take all measures within its power to prevent acts of torture and other abuses.[59]

B. Accountability Developments post-December 2024

National developments

Syrian authorities have taken initial steps to pursue justice domestically, including setting up two institutions on transitional justice and missing persons. However, civil society organizations have criticized the government's efforts on justice and accountability, thus far, due to the absence of public consultation, inclusivity, and limited public communications.[60]

The National Commission for Transitional Justice is mandated to "uncover the truth about the grave violations caused by the former regime, hold accountable those responsible in coordination with the relevant authorities, redress the harm inflicted on victims, and consolidate the principles of non-repetition and national reconciliation."[61] According to a representative of the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the commission is composed of six committees dealing with various aspects of transitional justice. These include technical committees addressing "criminal accountability," "civil peace," "truth-seeking," "memorialization," "reparations," and "guarantees of non-recurrence." The commission also set up ten bureaus tasked with cooperation with civil society, cooperation with international bodies, and with assessing legal and institutional reforms necessary to advance transitional justice nationally. At the time of writing, the commission and Damascus University had started to work on the development of a transitional justice law.[62] To Human Rights Watch's knowledge, official communication and public reporting regarding these developments is highly limited, which has restricted the ability of all stakeholders to engage in this critical first phase.[63] As of yet, there is also no indication as to how the commission will work with international and national authorities specifically on criminal investigations and prosecutions. There has been strong pushback from civil society organizations and victims' groups over fact that the decree stipulates an exclusive focus on crimes committed by the former government.[64] The commission committed to nationwide consultations and the establishment of an online complaint platform to receive complaints and suggestions.[65]

The National Commission for the Missing and Forcibly Disappeared is "tasked with researching and uncovering the fate of the missing and forcibly disappeared, documenting cases, establishing a national database, and providing legal and humanitarian support to their families." Based on the language of the decree establishing it, this commission does not appear to be limited to those missing and forcibly disappeared only by the former authorities. Its establishment has been met with cautious optimism by victims' associations and families, and the UN mechanism dealing with the missing. Despite its initial establishment via presidential decree without prior consultation with civil society, victims groups have since been involved in the setting up of the commission, which is not yet operational.[66] While it has made plans to work with relevant humanitarian institutions specialized in the search for the missing such as the IIMP, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the International Commission on Missing Persons, it is unclear how it will coordinate its work with the National Commission for Transitional Justice and other criminal accountability efforts like the IIIM, or those taking place in foreign jurisdictions. Such coordination, including to build bridges between the "humanitarian" work of the commission and prosecutorial efforts, is key to addressing the issue of the disappeared from a holistic perspective, that is, to ensure families are supported in both their search for their family members and for justice.[67]

Syrian and international civil society groups have organized multiple convenings to develop and advocate for an inclusive, comprehensive transitional justice process in the new Syrian context.[68] Some of the groups that documented abuses and supported criminal investigations and prosecutions taking place outside of Syria have put forward specific proposals. These include domestic legal reforms to prosecute international crimes nationally, the establishment of a hybrid or internationalized court to carry out investigations, prosecutions and trials, and concrete recommendations to the Syrian authorities to engage with the ICC and other international accountability mechanisms.[69] Syrian civil society expertise and strong connections to victim communities make their voice essential to any meaningful justice process.

International Criminal Court

Several of Syria's international partners, including the member states of the EU, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and civil society organizations in Syria and abroad, have called for Syria to accede to the Rome Statute.[70] Upon joining the court, the authorities could accept the ICC's jurisdiction retroactively through a declaration under Rome Statute article 12, which could give the court, for the first time, a mandate over crimes committed beginning in 2002, in addition to ongoing jurisdiction in the country.[71]

In addition to conducting its own investigations, the ICC and its Assembly of States Parties (ASP), the court's oversight body composed of representatives of its 125 member countries, has several other roles it can play to support prosecutions by other actors. In the case of the ICC, this could include lending experts and support to improve the domestic legal framework and practice of prosecuting international crimes, while the ASP can play a role in brokering similar assistance between Syria and ICC member countries.[72]

In January 2025, the ICC prosecutor travelled to Damascus at the invitation of Syrian President al-Sharaa to discuss how ICC prosecutors could support the Syrian authorities on accountability. In March, Syria's Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani also met the prosecutor in The Hague, to "reinforce the path towards transitional justice," signaling openness to the court playing a role in Syria's justice response.[73]

International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism

The IIIM has conducted two high-level visits to Damascus since December 2024 and has signaled its "readiness to support Syrian-led transitional justice efforts."[74] At the time of writing, the IIIM was waiting for authorization from Syrian authorities to establish an office to operate locally and to cooperate with the Syrian authorities.[75] In accordance with its mandate and terms of reference, the IIIM could support Syrian authorities with analyzing information and evidence within Syria, interviewing witnesses, and also potentially support national judicial institutions.[76]

In the meantime, the IIIM will play a crucial role for the foreseeable future when it comes to supporting authorities in third countries pursuing prosecutions in their national courts under the principle of universal jurisdiction or other forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The IIIM reported in March 2025 that "since the regime's collapse, [it has] already received [several] new requests for assistance, as previously dormant cases are now being reopened."[77] This is because such investigations and prosecutions rely on judicial cooperation across jurisdictions, and with civil society groups supporting victims and documentation efforts, among other activities. The Syrian authorities will need time to establish the legal frameworks and procedures necessary to facilitate this mutual legal assistance and cooperation with civil society.

UN Commission of Inquiry

Since the fall of the Assad government, the COI has conducted several visits to Syria and has continued its investigative work, including into recent atrocities committed in March in Syria's coastal region and the July violence in Sweida. The UN Human Rights Council renewed its mandate in April 2025.[78] One of the members of the commission has met with Syrian authorities.[79] In its June oral update to the UN Human Rights Council, the COI confirmed that it faced no restrictions in accessing the areas it requested to visit.[80] Nonetheless, a potential formal agreement between the COI and the Syrian authorities could help streamline the COI's processes and further simplify access to the country. In August 2025, the COI found that the violence that unfolded across Syria's coastal region in March was "widespread and systematic," and called on the authorities to "continue to pursue accountability for all perpetrators, regardless of affiliation or rank."[81] In a letter in response to the report, the Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani indicated that the government took "serious note of the alleged violations" and that the recommendations "will serve as a roadmap for Syria's continued progress."[82]

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

In December 2024, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) regained access to Syria after it had to leave the country in 2011. The OHCHR website indicates it will prioritize ensuring that Syrian-led transitional justice mechanisms are human rights compliant and inclusive.[83] In January 2025, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights visited Damascus and met with Syrian authorities.[84]

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

In February 2025, an OPCW high-level delegation met Syria's interim leadership in Damascus, and in March, Syria's foreign minister declared the authorities were ready to cooperate with the OPCW to eliminate the former Syrian government's chemical weapons program.[85] The OPCW's investigative team in charge of identifying the perpetrators of specific instances of chemical weapons use in Syria (the IIT) has continued its work. At the time of writing, OPCW teams have deployed to Syria four times since March 2025.[86]

Independent Institution on Missing Persons

Since its establishment shortly before the fall of the former government, the IIMP has stressed the humanitarian dimension of its mandate. It has underscored the importance of access to Syrian territory and communities, as well as the need for close cooperation with the Syrian National Commission for the Missing. Syrian authorities have expressed support for the IIMP's mandate and pledged to "provide all necessary facilitation to enable its work." The head of the IIMP has indicated the institution's intent to conduct monthly missions to Syria, and that it has agreed on points of cooperation with the head of the Syrian Commission for the Missing.[87] Discussions between the IIMP and Syrian officials regarding the permanent establishment of a presence in the country are currently ongoing.[88] In cooperation with victims and families groups, the IIMP has developed a process for families of missing persons to register their loved ones. After a trial and feedback period with families in Germany and Lebanon, the IIMP will formally launch the registration process in the coming months.[89]

Universal Jurisdiction

Universal jurisdiction cases have continued moving forward since the fall of the Assad government. Recent landmark verdicts include the war crimes conviction of Majdi Nema in France, a former spokesperson and senior official of the former Syrian opposition armed group Jaysh al-Islam.[90] A German court also sentenced a Syrian doctor to life in prison for crimes against humanity for torturing detainees at military hospitals.[91] Despite a changed political situation in Syria, universal jurisdiction will remain a key avenue to advance accountability, given the time needed to develop national or other alternative frameworks for accountability, the expertise developed by specialized war crimes units and other judicial authorities-particularly in Europe-and ongoing cases and outstanding arrest warrants.[92]

International Court of Justice

The case against Syria at the International Court of Justice is ongoing. In December 2024, the court extended the timeline for the parties' submission of evidence to June 2025 for the applicants and October 2026 for the respondent, considering "a change in government and the emergence of new evidence."[93] While Syria's transitional authorities are bound by the court's provisional measures order, and while they have welcomed the case, it is yet unclear if and how they will engage with the case.[94]

The following section provides a snapshot of some key challenges that Syria is facing or will likely face on the road to comprehensive accountability. These, of course, are not challenges that are unique to Syria, and there are important lessons that can be drawn from other experiences when it comes to delivering accountability for serious international crimes.

A. Political Context, Ongoing Violence, and the Risk of Selective Justice

In the wake of the Assad government's collapse in December 2024, Syrian authorities sought to consolidate power by integrating dozens of non-state armed groups into a fledgling Ministry of Defense.[95] The process in many cases was superficial: many factions retained their own loyalties and held onto fighters and commanders with well documented records of abuse. Against a backdrop of persistently high intercommunal tensions in Syria, identity-based violence and revenge killings, including those that occurred in Latakia, Tartous, and Hama governorates in March, and in Sweida in July (see above), underline the fragility of the country's transition towards peace. This fragile peace has further been threatened by the authorities' perceived failure to adequately respond to these abuses, many of which were committed by government forces and government-allied factions.[96] The government's empowering of armed groups outside its command during the July clashes has deepened the sense of lawlessness at a time when Syria needs professional, accountable security forces that represent and protect all communities without discrimination.[97] Such incidents will no doubt complicate justice efforts, but they also underscore the acute need to invest in accountability measures for past and ongoing violations as part of a sustainable peace.[98]

Justice for serious international crimes requires sustained political will on the part of national authorities to support impartial and independent justice. The fragile social context in Syria may have factored into a June governmental decision, which was strongly criticized by Syrian activists and civil society groups, to release several individuals accused of war crimes and massacres under the Assad government.[99] Additionally, so far, the Syrian government has failed to provide formal guarantees that crimes committed by warring parties during Syria's conflict, other than the previous government, will be addressed.[100] The UN Commission of Inquiry has identified this ongoing lack of clarity on the framework for justice as one of the reasons for ongoing violence in the country.[101]

Sustaining political will for justice in the long-term is a frequent challenge in transitional justice efforts. Tunisia's ambitious transitional justice process, initiated by a 2013 law to address human rights abuses and economic crimes from 1955 to 2013, has not resulted in concrete reparation and accountability measures due to a lack of political will and authoritarian retrenchment. The Truth and Dignity Commission received more than 62,000 complaints and transferred 205 cases of grave human rights abuses to specialized chambers, which led to prosecutions, including of former ministers, security officials, and businessmen. But no judgment has yet been issued more than seven years after the beginning of the first trial in May 2018. The Tunisian parliament has not acted on the commission's recommendations.[102]

While the work of Tunisia's commissions created a vital historical record and gave victims a public voice, the government ignored its recommendations for institutional reforms and reparations. From its inception, the commission faced criticism in the media, opposition from political parties, and obstacles to fulfilling its mandate, including from security and judicial authorities who impeded its work and blocked access to both archival evidence and the identities of implicated officials. As a result, prosecutions stalled, the recommended reparations fund was never operationalized, and reform never materialized. Since his 2021 power grab, President Kais Saied halted transitional justice efforts by issuing an amnesty law for financial crimes, adopting a new constitution without transitional justice guarantees, and systematically undermining judicial independence through control of the judiciary and arbitrary dismissals.[103]

The politization of judicial processes and unprincipled selectivity, such as the exclusion of certain sets of crimes, perpetrators, or victims from accountability efforts-as seen in the limitations in the formal mandate, thus far, of the National Commission for Transitional Justice-risks leading to or creating the perception of an illegitimate, incomplete, one-sided justice.[104] An example of biased justice with long-lasting consequences in the region includes Lebanon's 1991 and 2005 amnesty laws, which blocked the possibility of justice for the country's civil war-era victims and created the conditions for former leaders of abusive armed groups to become some of Lebanon's most prominent politicians today.[105] Lebanon has, to this day, largely failed to address any of the crimes committed during the 1975 to 1990 civil war, which has undermined internationally mandated efforts such as the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. The tribunal was created by the UN Security Council in 2005 with a narrow mandate to try-as acts of terrorism under domestic law-those responsible for a 2005 attack which killed 22 people including former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and injured 226 people. It closed in 2023 with only one conviction in absentia.

Post-ISIS Iraq underscores the pitfalls of one-sided justice efforts. Despite well documented serious abuses by the Iraqi government's armed forces and its allies in their battle against ISIS, including summary executions of suspected ISIS fighters, detention in inhumane conditions, and collective punishment against family members of ISIS fighters, no steps were taken by the authorities to investigate and hold Iraqi forces and commanders accountable.[106] In 2017, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/ISIL (known as UNITAD) at the request of the government of Iraq to support domestic efforts to hold members of ISIS accountable. However, UNITAD's investigative mandate was limited to serious crimes allegedly committed by ISIS, excluding abuses by anti-ISIS forces and any other party.[107] UNITAD's mandate fell short of the comprehensive approach needed to end the selective justice that has plagued Iraq for decades.[108]

Amnesties for serious international crimes violate victims' right to an effective remedy and are inconsistent with the obligation of national authorities to investigate and, where sufficient evidence exists, prosecute crimes under international law.[109]

B. Uncertain Transition and Judicial Independence

Syrian authorities face numerous challenges in reforming government institutions within and beyond the justice sector. It remains unclear whether, or to what extent, it will be possible for the authorities to assert full territorial control of Syria, let alone carry out these reforms. The new constitutional declaration, announced in March, risks entrenching authoritarian control rather than facilitating a genuine transition to a rights-respecting government.[110] This is because although the declaration affirms judicial independence, it lacks clear safeguards to ensure it can be implemented. For instance, the president has the authority to appoint members of the Higher Constitutional Court without parliamentary or other oversight and there are, for now, no mechanisms to guarantee judicial independence, or an independent body to oversee judicial appointments, promotions, discipline, and removals. This means that the judiciary may be vulnerable to political interference and may have limited ability to hold the president accountable.[111]

These gaps raise concerns about the possibility of renewed instrumentalization of the judicial system to repress civil society and peaceful dissent. For decades, under Baath party rule, the country's legal framework and court system were central tools for repressing the rights of Syrians rather than guaranteeing them.[112] Syrian laws, in particular counterterrorism provisions, served as a thin legal veneer for systemic persecution, arbitrary arrest, disappearances, and torture of perceived activists and opponents.[113] In March, the constitutional declaration abolished all exceptional laws, voided the legal effects of the Anti-Terrorism Court, and repealed security-based restrictions related to civil and property documents.

Libya's experience provides one example in the broader region demonstrating how the absence of an impartial, functioning judiciary has, in part, perpetuated impunity for serious crimes for over a decade. While Libya's political landscape and social structures differ significantly from Syria, important lessons can be drawn from its prolonged political transition that has failed to bring about respect for the rule of law. In the context of a volatile security environment and with two rival authorities in the east and west who compete for legitimacy and control, the basic protection and integrity of the judiciary have not been achieved. Despite a somewhat similar institutional crisis, the Syrian government's level of control over territory and the security establishment differ greatly.[114]

The fragmentation and deep political polarization of Libya's justice sector, even for ordinary crimes, offers a cautionary tale for Syria.[115] Legal professionals in Libya operate under threat of arbitrary arrest and violence by armed groups, while judicial procedures lack basic due process rights and fair trial rights are not respected, detention conditions are inhumane, and military prosecutors routinely try civilians.[116] There have been instances of political interference by authorities. For example, the eastern-based House of Representatives (HOR) in the past interfered in the composition of the Supreme Judicial Council, the highest judicial body in Libya responsible for organizing the legal system, which dealt a blow to the rule of law.[117] In September 2024, the HOR established a Supreme Constitutional Court in Benghazi as a rival to the constitutional chamber of the Libyan Supreme Court in Tripoli, risking a constitutional crisis and conflicting rulings.[118] Taken together, these moves have undermined trust in the justice system and exacerbated flagrant impunity of security sector actors while doing little to address serious international crimes that have occurred. A stark example of this is the mass trial of former officials from Gaddafi's government including former intelligence chief, Abdullah Al-Senussi, and Gaddafi's son Saif, which fell far short of international fair‑trial standards. Defendants were denied meaningful legal representation and the court case suffered from a number of procedural flaws, including limiting access to court documents for defense lawyers and preventing them from attending interrogations. Al-Senussi was one of eight convicted and sentenced to death despite these serious due process violations and allegations of ill treatment.[119]

C. Legal and Institutional Reform Drawing on National and International Expertise

The Syrian national judicial system will also face significant technical challenges when it comes to the prosecution of serious international crimes. A wide range of legal and institutional frameworks are essential to ensure effective prosecutions of serious international crimes.[120] The Syrian penal code does not criminalize war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, or other international crimes including enforced disappearance, and nor does it adequately address torture.[121] Currently, the legal framework does not provide for key modes of liability that are often essential for the effective prosecution of serious international crimes when it comes to determining responsibility by those higher up the chain of command, including what is known as command responsibility. There is also no dedicated legal or institutional framework in place for the protection of witnesses.

There have been similar hurdles in Libya's failed efforts to achieve accountability. At the time of writing, Libya's penal code fails to define grave international crimes as such, and does not specifically criminalize grave international crimes including genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, enforced disappearance, and torture, hindering progress towards accountability.[122] Like Libya, Syria's legal framework also provides for the imposition of the death penalty, and death sentences were widely used by the former Syrian government as a tool of repression.[123] In Rwanda, the government abolished the death penalty in order to get support from international actors for domestic proceedings following the 1994 genocide.[124]

In addition to legal frameworks, the development of specialized institutional expertise will be needed. Cases involving grave crimes such as war crimes and crimes against humanity tend to be extremely complex to investigate, prove, defend against, and adjudicate.[125] Extensive evidence and potentially hundreds of witnesses are usually involved. Moreover, perpetrators may be individuals who once held or continue to hold senior positions in national armed forces or are senior figures in armed groups that continue to hold power.[126] International experience shows that identifying the most responsible individuals and proving links between acts on the ground and orders or acquiescence from above requires extensive prosecutorial and judicial experience. In general, best practices in the investigation and prosecution of serious crimes remain largely inaccessible within Syria, due in part, to the lack of appropriate specialized training for legal professionals, according to civil society representatives. Experts have highlighted this expertise gap in Syria as a challenge, noting that it could be addressed through experience-sharing between Syrian judicial authorities and war crimes units, legal experts from civil society, and other institutions working on universal jurisdiction trials in third countries.[127] As a core part of broader judicial reform, the experience of other countries suggests that the addition of dedicated and specialized judicial mechanisms for serious international crimes embedded in the national justice system, with support from international judicial experts could be an important step to bridge this expertise gap.[128] The Syrian government should take these elements into account in its efforts to develop a transitional justice law.[129]

The Iraq experience, among others, demonstrates, however, that there needs to be a balance between sharing of international expertise and unwarranted international overreach in accountability efforts for international crimes. The Iraqi High Tribunal was set up in 2003 when Iraq was still occupied by the US military. The United States was heavily involved in the selection of experts involved in the workings of the court. Such influence negatively affected public perception of the tribunal's legitimacy.[130] Additionally, the tribunal failed to recognize other relevant international and Iraqi expertise. The Coalition Provisional Authority, the post invasion, US-led administration in Iraq insisted on an "Iraqi-led" process but did not establish a transparent process to consult victims' groups and civil society organizations or to more broadly assess Iraqi attitudes towards issues of justice and accountability. It also confined international experts to advisory positions, despite a clear gap in Iraqi expertise, at the time, on international criminal law, transitional justice, and the prosecution of international crimes.[131]

The Iraq example bolsters the view that any justice effort in Syria must center and value the views and expertise of Syrian victims and survivors as well as the human rights groups that have backed campaigns for justice for more than a decade.

D. Evidence Preservation and Analysis

With the fall of the Assad government and the opening of detention centers, an enormous volume of potential evidence is now available. The documents, prison cells, interrogation rooms, and torture devices in the former government's security facilities as well as mass grave sites are part of crime scenes that are at risk of vanishing, being destroyed or not being preserved and stored, and should be safeguarded to properly ensure that information and evidence can be used in the long-term. In the days after the previous government's collapse, civil society groups publicly alerted the authorities that official documents were often left unprotected, with significant portions looted or destroyed, including in detention facilities.[132] There were reports of mass graves dug up by families or residents while looking for information about their missing loved ones. In one case, neighborhood residents painted the cells of the local prison in a bid to underscore the need to pursue justice, but in the process may have compromised important evidence.[133] This underlined the need for practical and strategic safeguarding of potential evidence for future transitional justice efforts, including criminal proceedings. The UN Commission of Inquiry reported that the government has taken steps to preserve evidence, but it is unclear whether best standards and practices for the handling and preservation of evidence have been or will be consistently applied throughout Syria.[134]

In Iraq, in 2003 and 2004, US-led coalition forces failed to safeguard official documents and the remains of victims in mass graves, resulting in evidence being lost or seriously tainted. The lack of focus or expertise in securing, cataloging, and exhuming evidence led to partial or massive loss, contamination, underutilization of evidence and other serious limitations in building credible cases. This was a key factor in the significant gaps in evidence for the trial of Saddam Hussein, and seven other defendants, before the Iraqi High Tribunal. Human Rights Watch found that, along with other procedural and substantive flaws, the verdict was flawed.[135]

In other contexts, international expertise can be brought to bear to assist national authorities in securing and preserving evidence. UNITAD was mandated to collect, preserve and store evidence of alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed by ISIS in Iraq. Throughout its mandate period from 2017-2024, UNITAD also provided expertise, equipment, and trainings for Iraqi personnel to enhance their evidence collection, as well as their ability to acquire, manage, and verify digital evidence, including through the forensic retrieval from online sources, utilizing advanced open-source intelligence techniques.[136] For example, UNITAD assisted the Mass Graves Directorate in the exhumation of mass graves and supported Iraq's Medico-Legal Directorate's forensic DNA laboratory in obtaining accreditation from the International Organization for Standards. Accreditation means determinations made by the laboratory in Baghdad would be internationally recognized, allowing its findings to be accepted as evidence in courts globally and enhancing the possibility for cooperation in legal proceedings in third countries.[137] Despite these positive efforts, a number of legal and political obstacles considerably undermined the impact and effectiveness of UNITAD's work in Iraq (see sections on political context, ongoing violence, and the risk of selective justice and on cooperation with other jurisdictions).

E. International Access to Syria and Cooperation with Other Jurisdictions

Given the challenges for national proceedings, international efforts will remain the primary operational avenues to carry out criminal proceedings in the near term. International actors, like the IIIM, the COI, and judicial authorities in war crimes units in other countries can continue to preserve evidence, collect information and testimonies or carry out other work in support of advancing criminal proceedings abroad. Because of their existing efforts over many years, they have also earned the trust of many victims.[138] However, to accomplish their mandates in this changed context, these actors need to access Syrian territory to monitor and investigate abuses and violations, allowing for the assessment, evaluation, collection, authentication, and identification of evidence; consultation with communities affected by crimes; and building working relationships and procedures with Syrian authorities and institutions. A presence in the country will advance necessary local relationship building. In spite of a number of international efforts on justice already being set up-in large part due to the successful advocacy of Syrian civil society-the perceived inaction on the part of the international community to end the Assad government's atrocities over 13 years has seriously tainted the general population's view of international actors, including the UN.[139] This lack of trust could be exploited by Syrian authorities to marginalize the role of international actors in a transitional justice process, at the expense of international support necessary for effective processes. At the time of writing, the IIIM, the IIMP, and the COI are still in the process of obtaining authorization to set up activities in Syria. While they have been given ad hoc opportunities to engage with the authorities and survivors within the country, Syrian authorities should provide complete territorial access and permit them to operate field offices, as needed, to fulfil their mandate.

Strong and long-term cooperation frameworks with international entities, such as UN agencies, facilitate more effective workflows and can play a critical role in advancing investigations and prosecutions in courts. UNITAD's experience conversely highlights how the absence of a robust foundation for collaboration can undermine the impact of internationally mandated initiatives.

In the aftermath of ISIS abuses in Iraq and Syria, political will for a full-fledged tribunal was lacking in Iraq, and without sufficient support from third states, UNITAD, an investigative mechanism without prosecutorial authorities, was set up as a compromise. Issues in Iraq's legal system, including a lack of laws to prosecute core international crimes, concerns about fairness of trials, and use of the death penalty, were clear at the time UNITAD's mandate and terms of reference were drafted. Those obliged UNITAD to follow UN policies and best practices, including a ban on sharing evidence with states that apply the death penalty. There was hope that after establishing UNITAD, Iraq would follow suit in laying the foundation for the team to work with Iraq's domestic authorities and undertake reforms. However, efforts to this end did not yield results.[140] Thus, evidence collected by UNITAD over the course of its mandate was not shared with Iraqi authorities. When UNITAD's mandate ended in September 2024, modalities of evidence sharing with Iraqi authorities remained unresolved, including questions of archiving, access, and obtaining informed consent from survivors to transfer their testimony to Iraqi authorities or third-state jurisdictions.

Positive examples of an effective cooperation and coordination framework can be drawn from the Eurojust-hosted joint investigation teams (JIT), which are made up of specialized investigators and prosecutors from different countries that share experience, evidence, and strategy for prosecuting crimes in a specific situation. In the context of Syria, extensive cooperation between Sweden, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium was facilitated by a Eurojust-supported JIT into crimes against Yezidi victims in Syria and Iraq (also assisted by UNITAD and the IIIM); a German-French JIT was set up with the support of Eurojust and the EU Genocide Network to investigate the Syrian intelligence services' involvement in the death of 27 members of the opposition party, due to torture and inhumane conditions of imprisonment. Both JITs led to convictions in a number of European countries.[141] Eurojust facilitates the development of cooperation frameworks among JIT members, and provides support to investigators on the ground, such as organizing coordination meetings, funding travel and equipment, and drafting and processing mutual legal assistance requests.[142]

F. Strategic Coordination of Justice Initiatives

As detailed above, with justice blocked in Syria and before the ICC, numerous other pathways have developed since 2011. Going forward, there should be careful consideration given to how to bring about coordination between existing and future efforts. There may already be a risk of duplication. For example, the mandates of the two Syrian national commissions overlap with those of the IIMP, the IIIM, and OHCHR. Insufficient coordination between justice mechanisms could lead to duplication of efforts and waste financial and human resources with limited impact for victims and survivors. A multiplication of mechanisms may also raise concerns about the sustainability of such mechanisms given scarce resources to fund justice efforts. Transitional justice contexts are often marked by coordination challenges. A recent example of efforts to address this issue of coordination and division of labor is the Dialogue Group on Accountability for Ukraine. The group brings together states, the ICC, Ukrainian authorities, the EU, and civil society organizations to "discuss and align national and international accountability initiatives."[143]

At the time of writing, given the limitations of domestic and international justice options with jurisdiction over crimes committed in Syria, the international community, in coordination with Syrian authorities and Syrian civil society, should play a proactive role in identifying and advancing tangible justice options for Syria. It could be of particular significance to explore the role of the UN General Assembly, given its historical engagement in Syria, including in the set-up of the IIIM.[144] These efforts should aim to enable credible prosecutorial avenues that meet international standards, tailored to the Syrian context and informed by lessons learned from other situation countries where atrocities have been committed, including those outlined in this briefing note. Any international support should ensure that justice sector reform and international assistance do not only build capacity but embed rights and accountability at every stage of the criminal justice system, including but not limited to the treatment of detainees and ensuring fair trials. Ensuring leadership and ownership by diverse segments of Syrian society does not preclude the engagement of international experts, institutions, supportive foreign governments, and the international community. Their involvement in advancing processes to seize existing or create future justice avenues, with full prosecutorial powers, can help a timelier and principle-based delivery of justice at a time when Syria is developing the capacities, institutions, and legal frameworks to do so.

Action by the international community, such as through the UN General Assembly, could help make best possible use of the international justice system, clearly identify gaps, and contribute to the development of tailored proposals and solutions, such as helping to make possible use of national, international or other more innovative judicial avenues.

G. Centering Victims and Affected Communities

Given the context of Syria's conflict as well as the scope and scale of crimes that have affected Syrians across religious and ethnic communities and identities, inclusivity of victims is crucial to ensure that the justice process is meaningful and legitimate. Centering victims and affected communities require ongoing, meaningful engagement, including through open communication and genuine opportunities for contributions and feedback as well as providing for procedural rights, where possible. This engagement should be carried out from the outset of designing transitional justice measures by government authorities through to their implementation, including by judicial actors. This will require dedicated programs for public information-often known as "outreach" in the context of trials for serious international crimes-aimed at ensuring that justice is not only accomplished in fact but seen and understood by the public to be done. Any prosecuting body, whether in Syria or as part of a hybrid or international tribunal, will need to develop a prosecutorial strategy to deal with the broad range of international crimes committed and the large number of alleged perpetrators. Affected communities should be consulted as part of this process, to the extent possible.[145]

Tunisia's experience offers a strong example of how public participation can create a victim-centered, meaningfully designed transitional justice effort. Following the 2011 revolution, the National Constituent Assembly launched a nationwide dialogue on transitional justice, organizing a broad consultation with various groups to determine the best approach to address the legacy of dictatorship under Ben Ali. As discussed above, the resulting law created the Truth and Dignity Commission, which received over 62,000 complaints spanning 60 years, held televised public hearings, and referred more than 205 serious human rights cases to special courts.[146] This participatory approach significantly helped to reflect victims' and communities' expectations in the design of the transitional justice process.

Best practices in other contexts include Colombia's Juridicción Especial para la Paz (JEP) (Special Jurisdiction for Peace), which includes ambitious mechanisms for victims' participation. Colombian legislation, including JEP statutory law, obliges the JEP to include the "effective participation of victims" in its proceedings, ensuring an ethnical and cultural perspective, and protecting the victims involved.[147] The JEP has created a "handbook" detailing victim participation in its proceedings.[148] Victims are allowed to submit reports on abuses to the JEP so that these are considered in the court system's macro-cases, that is, large complex cases that group together human rights violations and crimes committed during the armed conflict. Victims also have a right to provide evidence, file appeals, participate in public hearings, among other forms of participation.

Thus far, however, in Syria, despite references to the need for a "victims-centered justice" in the constitutional declaration, beyond public commitments to engage with civil society organizations on accountability efforts made in international fora, and a limited number of consultative meetings between government authorities and civil society groups and experts, the government has not provided clarity on how, or whether, a diversity of victims and stakeholders will be meaningfully included in shaping or participating in the domestic process.[149]

The experience of the IIIM, the COI, and the IIMP in Syria can hold valuable, context-specific lessons for Syria's authorities and other actors engaged on justice. The effectiveness of these UN mechanisms and of extraterritorial prosecutions for crimes committed in Syria has largely relied on victims' groups' expertise. The IIIM concluded numerous cooperation frameworks with NGOs, and both the IIMP and the IIIM developed robust, community-sensitive outreach strategies.[150] In the context of Syria, the opening of civic space can play a vital role in supporting these efforts.

F. Funding Justice and Reparations Efforts

Thirteen years of conflict and displacement have left much of Syria's infrastructure and economy in ruins, and until recently, large parts of the country's economy were under broad international economic sanctions.[151] Syrian civil society-which, as set out above, has been at the forefront of accountability efforts-is facing a lack of resources to maintain its justice-related activities due in part to recent US government cuts in its development assistance budget.[152] More broadly, the UN's liquidity crisis and the broader financial crisis facing the institution will be a significant hurdle in adequately staffing and resourcing accountability initiatives, including those relating to Syria.[153] This has already been publicly raised by representatives of the IIIM and the IIMP as well as European governments.[154]

Securing durable, dedicated funding is a common, long-term challenge for transitional justice efforts. The Cambodian government's deliberate refusal to pay local staff at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the judicial body meant to try those most responsible for Khmer Rouge crimes, illustrates how funding can have a political function, undermining efforts to bring former rulers to justice.[155]

In addition to ensuring adequate financial support for criminal accountability, multiple challenges remain to provide reparations to entitled individuals, groups, and communities harmed as a result of the Syrian conflict, in particular victims of the most serious crimes. Such reparations could be provided directly by perpetrators, through national programs, international mechanisms, or other initiatives designed to ensure that victims' rights are met.[156] One of these challenges relates to financial and technical backing needed to develop and breathe life into a dedicated institutional and legal framework with specialized expertise to support reparations processes associated with criminal or administrative proceedings. After the publication of its final report and four years of investigation, Tunisia's Truth and Dignity Commission recommended reparations for the thousands of victims of torture, political imprisonment, and other grave abuses. Unfortunately, the fund meant to pay for the reparations was never appropriately financed by the Tunisian government and international donors.[157] In Syria, civil society organizations have suggested that asset confiscations relating to serious crimes should be repurposed for reparations.[158]

To the Syrian Authorities

The Syrian government bears the primary responsibility to advance justice, which will require developing national capacity on justice and ongoing support from international initiatives that have been underway since before the fall of the Assad government. The government should:

• Commit publicly to support all credible efforts to pursue impartial and independent justice for victims and survivors of crimes committed by all parties to the 2011-2024 conflict, and explicitly expand the mandate of the National Commission for Transitional Justice to that end;
• Commit publicly to exclude amnesties for core international crimes;
• Engage proactively with established international mechanisms, including the IIIM, the IIMP, and the COI, as well as with authorities in third states investigating and prosecuting crimes committed in Syria. This should include full cooperation in areas like evidence collection, preservation, and analysis, and ensuring unhindered access to and supporting the establishment of offices and cooperation framework bodies including the IIIM, the COI, and the IIMP;
• Ratify the Rome Statute of the ICC, without reservations or declarations, and lodge a declaration under Rome Statute article 12 to give the court retroactive jurisdiction dating back to 2002;
• Ratify other key human rights treaties, including the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance;
• Ensure full cooperation with and access to humanitarian actors, like the International Committee of the Red Cross, into Syria's detention facilities. Reform the detention system and ensure the right of due process and the international standards of protection for anyone already in prison, arrested or under police custody, including for their role in serious crimes. Ensure that everyone is detained according to the law and that no one is detained in inhumane or degrading conditions;
• In accordance with the ICJ's provisional order, take measures to prevent acts of torture and other abuses, prohibit torture in Syria's domestic laws, and participate fully in the ICJ proceedings;
• Conduct speedy but comprehensive legislative reform with the participation of legal scholars and domestic and international civic groups including domestic reforms to ensure the independence of Syria's judiciary, and invest in training and specialization in core international crimes for Syria's judiciary such as, but not limited to, sexual and gender- based violence trainings and victim and witness protection, including with the support of international experts. Support legislative efforts to swiftly align Syria's national legislation with the Rome Statute and other international law standards necessary for the effective investigation and prosecution of serious international crimes;
• Ensure laws and procedures are sensitive to the unique challenges faced by and the needs of survivors of sexual violence, including adequate legal definitions and avoiding statutes of limitations that hinder accountability in the case of delayed reporting;
• Repeal, as a matter of priority, all laws that violate international law and Syria's interim constitution including laws that criminalize peaceful speech and assembly, and abusive state-security laws;
• Abolish the death penalty and uphold the moratorium on all executions;
• Repeal legislation that permits trial of civilians in a military court;
• Ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;
• Secure and preserve, on an urgent basis, evidence of atrocities by all parties, in particular those committed during the time of the government of former President Bashar al-Assad, and invite international actors to assist in this regard;
• Recognize, foster, and uphold civic space and actively seek to center Syrian civil society and victims' groups in government initiatives to advance justice; and
• Clarify strategy, timeline, and modalities of nationwide consultations and feedback on criminal accountability and other transitional justice processes. This includes providing space for the involvement of Syrian civil society in the development and functioning of the National Commission for Transitional Justice, the National Commission for the Missing, and the clarification of the mandate and coordination of any future national bodies relating to serious crimes.

To Syria's International Partners and All States

Transitional justice processes should be victim-and-survivor-centered and respond to the overall needs of affected communities to advance the fight against impunity. At the same time, the international community has a critical role to play. Existing UN entities working on Syria, such as the IIIM, the IIMP, the COI, OHCHR and other relevant UN experts should be permitted full access and cooperation in accordance with their existing mandates. The international community of states-first and foremost the UN General Assembly-have a critical role to play in fostering political will and advancing impartial and independent justice, including by securing financial support and ensuring full compliance with international human rights standards in its execution. Syria's international partners and all states should:

• Work to establish credible, internationally supported prosecutorial avenues at the national and international level, tailored to the Syrian context, drawing on lessons from other atrocity situations, to ensure that perpetrators face justice;
• Convene a grouping of states-including those that supported the establishment of the IIIM, the IIMP, and the failed efforts for a UN Security Council referral of Syria to the ICC in 2014-to meet regularly, liaise with the Syrian authorities, civil society, the UN, and other relevant actors and stakeholders;
• Support efforts to develop an inclusive consultation process among Syrians and other international experts to ensure victim-and-survivor-centered justice efforts;
• Establish robust coordination among domestic and international justice efforts to avoid duplication of efforts, ensure efficient use of financial and human resources, and maximize the impact of justice initiatives for victims and survivors;
• Use public and private engagement with Syria's government to secure commitments to ensure impartial accountability and judicial independence, including the revision of the constitutional declaration to incorporate strong protections for judicial independence and legislative oversight of executive actions; cooperation with international justice efforts; ratification of the Rome Statute and acceptance of the ICC's retroactive jurisdiction alongside other key human rights treaties;
• Support and bolster ongoing efforts by internationally mandated mechanisms, in particular the IIIM, to document, preserve and analyze potential evidence that could be vital to ongoing and future domestic and international accountability processes;
• Ensure that-given the new demands created by the changed situation in Syria-the work of UN mechanisms and civil society organizations is adequately funded, resourced, and supported by practical and political cooperation;
• Help facilitate and fund initiatives aimed at rebuilding, reforming and reconstructing Syria's criminal justice system; and
• When applicable, support and fund a robust and inclusive framework to ensure adequate, effective, and prompt reparations for individuals in both criminal proceedings and administrative programs.

Governments and judicial authorities in countries conducting investigations and prosecutions of serious international crimes in Syria should:

• Consider working with Syrian authorities to develop cooperation frameworks for evidence collection and witness protection; and
• Consider engaging with Syrian authorities to reiterate their commitment to continuously pursue cases of serious international crimes in Syria, under the principle of universal jurisdiction or extraterritorial jurisdictions.

--