Researchers at Hiroshima University (Japan) have introduced a new philosophical framework—"conditional bad-difference view" (Conditional BDV)—to understanding ethically important features of disability. Published in the journal Bioethics , Conditional BDV offers a nuanced way to think about the relationship between disability and well-being, aiming to better reflect and respect the diverse experiences of disabled individuals.
The Conditional BDV was developed in response to shortcomings in the two dominant philosophical perspectives for disabilities. The "bad-difference view" (BDV) holds that a disability is inherently detrimental to well-being, even in ideal situations without discrimination against disabled people. By contrast, the "mere-difference view" (MDV) considers a disability as ethically neutral in such non-discriminatory settings, just like race and gender. The novel Conditional BDV challenges this binary perspective, proposing instead that a disability is harmful if and only if it interferes with an individual's ability to pursue their aspirations.
"Our view introduces a nuance reflecting the diverse experiences of disabled people, which has often been missing from these debates," said corresponding author Shu Ishida , contributing assistant professor at Hiroshima University's Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences . "Whether a disability is bad or neutral for a disabled person depends on how it affects the person's aspired way of life."
The article provides an in-depth philosophical analysis of this newly coined framework, using thought experiments to highlight where the two standard views fall short and where the Conditional BDV succeeds. In particular, in response to the long-standing philosophical dispute on whether all disabilities are mere or bad differences for all disabled people, Conditional BDV suggests that one's mental/physical conditions can negatively affect one's well-being depending on the person's aspirations and their disability.
The researchers also address several possible objections to the Conditional BDV.
One is multiple realizability objection, in which a valuable experience can be achieved in many ways, such that the disability does not hinder one's aspirations. However, the authors overcome this objection by noting that the combination of certain disabilities does significantly restrict one's valuable experiences, and some disabled individuals narrow their defined life-time goals.
Another criticism is the disability-specific goods objection, in which a disability sometimes does not lead to a loss of valuable experiences but a gain, such that the disability is not detrimental to one's well-being. The authors explain that while some disability may involve gains, those gains do not apply to all disabled people.
Not all objections were fully resolved, however. One is the normative relevance objection, which doubts whether Conditional BDV can address important questions in the philosophy of disabilities, such as the ethical questions about selecting for disabled or non-disabled fetuses. While this objection was not overcome, the authors point out that it is a challenge to most theories in the field and thus does not undermine the overall usefulness of the Conditional BDV.
Hiroshima University Professor (Special Recognition) Tsutomu Sawai , study co-corresponding author, emphasizes that the Conditional BDV was proposed more for guiding principles than for rigorous implementation in everyday decision-making.
"Conditional BDV aligns more naturally with the research and development of assistive technologies than current frameworks, and involves the disabled in the conversation much more than existing models," he said.
Mitsuru Sasaki-Honda of the Institute of Biomedicine and Biotechnology of Cantabria (Spain) and Kyoto University (Japan) also contributed to the study.
