If the polling is accurate, One Nation is becoming a serious force in Australian politics.
But its considerable polling support and electoral breakthroughs in South Australia and Farrer raise a fundamental question for the conservative side of politics. Should the Coalition and One Nation form an electoral pact to defeat Labor? And what should this pact look like?
Liberal Frontbencher Tony Pasin caused a media storm recently by arguing the Coalition and One Nation " should work hand-in-glove to defeat Labor ". Pasin argues that to avoid competing with each other, the Liberals and One Nation should come to an agreement about which seats they field candidates in at the next election.
Pasin's call comes as One Nation leader Pauline Hanson outlines her demands for any such agreement. At the same time, newly installed Liberal Party President Tony Abbott has also signalled his support for a preference deal with the right-wing populist party.
The Coalition is reckoning with how it can convert anti-Labor support into election victory. They will also be acutely aware that it is possible a strong anti-Labor vote being split between two groups on the right could help Labor maintain office at state and federal levels.
What does history tell us?
Before 1918, Australian federal elections were held under the first-past-the-post system, in which only first preferences are counted. The 1918 Swan byelection motivated conservative parties to introduce preferential voting. The aim of this reform was to reduce the impact of vote splitting, which had enabled Labor victories.
So since 1918, Australia has used preferential ballots, where voters rank candidates in order of preference. This allows voters to give their first preference to the party they most prefer, without worrying about its electoral prospects.
Despite being introduced by the right, preferential voting has worked effectively for the left in Australia in the past few decades. Greens preferences have been found to flow to Labor at a rate of almost 90% at the 2025 federal election .
In the modern era, the Coalition parties have further prevented vote splitting by not contesting against incumbent Coalition members. Pasin has proposed a similar arrangement between One Nation and the Coalition.
Why is One Nation's rise a problem for the right?
Preference discipline between One Nation and the Coalition is far lower than that between the Greens and Labor. While rates of preferencing from One Nation to the Coalition rose to a record high of 74.5% in the 2025 federal election , as recently as 2016 these rates were close to 50%. This suggests the Coalition cannot rely on One Nation preferences to the extent Labor can depend on preferences from Greens voters.
Likewise, Coalition preference rates to One Nation are also relatively low. Data from the Farrer byelection show 59% of Liberal and 70% of Nationals voters preferenced One Nation over the independent. It is important to note, though, that Labor did not field a candidate in this byelection. Flows against a Labor candidate would likely be stronger.
Additionally, both One Nation and the Coalition would have to direct finite political resources towards competing with each other in Coalition held seats - rather than defeating Labor.
Other kinds of accommodation between the parties are openly being canvassed because of these lower preference rates, the costs of competition, and the Coalition's particularly dire primary polling.
What can we learn from the rest of the world?
Stand-aside pacts similar to that flagged by Pasin were discussed (at least in the media) between the Conservatives and right-wing populist party Reform in the lead-up to the 2024 UK election.
This idea was subsequently rejected . However, it has been re-litigated in light of the 2026 Makerfield byelection, to be held on June 18. There, Labour candidate Andy Burnham - considered a possible future prime minister - faces a close contest with Reform.
Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch, whose party has seen a series of high-profile defections to Reform, has rejected an accommodation as " stitch-up nonsense ".
Academic research suggests mainstream parties are most likely to create formal Coalitions with radical parties when they are in electoral strife and seeking to win back voters, while simultaneously trying to blunt the outsider appeal of radical parties.
The 2017 Austrian Election is an illustrative case. In this case, the centre-right ÖVP formed a coalition government with the radical-right FPÖ, but it fell apart within two years due to scandals within the FPÖ. The FPÖ's support fell by 10% in the subsequent 2019 election , to the benefit of the ÖVP.
However, in the 2024 elections , the FPÖ became the largest party - forcing the ÖVP into coalition with the centre-left Social Democrats - showing the temporary nature of mainstream gains from this strategy.
In neighbouring Germany, mainstream parties have taken a principled stance to maintain a " Brandmauer " - a firewall - against cooperation with the far-right Alternative for Deutschland (AfD). Despite leading to messy government formations, the justification for this policy is that the AfD holds views on immigration and other issues that undermine liberal democracy.
Other countries such as Sweden have taken a middle path, where minority centre-right governments have been propped up with supply and confidence agreements or tacit support from radical-right actors, as opposed to formal coalitions. This allows such governments to maintain a degree of political distance.
What cooperation is most likely in Australia?
Both the Liberals and One Nation have expressed reluctance about forming a formal coalition. Opposition Leader Angus Taylor has explicitly spoken against any kind of seat " carve-up ".
In Australia's unique system - preference deals (and supply and confidence should it arise) are the most likely form of cooperation.
However, the Coalition runs the risk of further eroding its support by signalling to voters One Nation is a suitable mainstream alternative.
One Nation, meanwhile, risks losing its outsider status through close cooperation with mainstream parties. A lack of preference discipline could also see an inefficient distribution of anti-Labor support, and in the worst case for the parties on the right, they ultimately cannibalise each other and help Labor return to office.
Josh Sunman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
