What is the appropriate role for the United States when its allies are at war? Despite its power and influence, the U.S. often lacks the ability to intervene when it believes that a change in direction—or even the winding down of the conflict—is warranted. A new report by the Brookings Institution concludes that the U.S. can do a better job of communicating clearly from the outset of the conflict, so that both the U.S. and its allies are in synch about political and strategic goals. In addition, the U.S. should be willing to do more to persuade allies to adjust their course of action when necessary.
Dafna Rand , a senior foreign policy fellow at Brookings and a former senior State Department official, examined four recent conflicts involving U.S. allies: Ukraine and Russia, Israel and Hamas, Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, and Afghanistan and the Taliban. A former assistant secretary for democracy, human rights, and labor at the State Department, Rand developed a series of recommendations for how the U.S. can more effectively bring its influence to bear in conflicts involving its allies. Rand, who has studied international conflict resolution for decades, was the director of foreign assistance at the State Department when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, and until 2024 led efforts to increase in security assistance and other aid to Ukraine.
"These wars provide a wealth of data for how the U.S. can better navigate the changing and slippery terrain of modern conflicts," Rand said. "Supporting our allies, while also trying to manage and control the overall conflict, has never been more difficult."
For her research, Rand did a series of in-depth one-on-one interviews with more than 30 senior U.S. and foreign officials involved in the four conflicts. She also talked with senior government officials from other countries that were involved in the conflicts or were involved in the diplomacy surrounding them. For this report, she focused mostly on two of the wars: Ukraine and Gaza.
Rand identified a series of missteps and misunderstandings that undermined America's ability to manage and influence allies' strategies. While emphasizing that the Ukraine and Gaza wars were extremely complex, and that the U.S. was only one of several key stakeholders involved in these conflicts, she argues that the U.S. could have been more effective at clarifying its aims and influencing its allies. Rand notes that in general, ending conflicts should be a top goal for U.S. policymakers.
At the outset of Israel's war with Hamas in Gaza, for example, the U.S. tried to convey the importance of limiting the conflict, arguing that it would be difficult if not impossible to completely destroy Hamas. But Rand's sources agreed that the Israel did not fully take in this message, particularly at senior levels. In addition, the U.S. and Israel never reached agreement about the duration of the war or its overall strategic goals. The U.S. focused on the release of hostages held by Hamas, while Israel prioritized the complete destruction of the group. Some of Rand's sources argued that withholding, or threatening to withhold, some weapons from Israel could have been an effective tool for the U.S. to persuade Israel to moderate its approach.
Rand notes that conflicts tend to be more difficult to end now than in prior decades. Wars now are more likely to involve intrastate insurgencies or terrorist groups, rather than two separate states. These conflicts are often more difficult to end, because terrorist and insurgent groups can more easily go into hiding, and are rarely willing to declare a war completely over. Over the past six years, there have been 22 such conflicts—the same number as in the entire 2010s.
Rand developed a series of recommendations to help U.S. more effectively influence allies to pursue a rational course of action as they engage in conflict. Among her recommendations:
- It is crucial for the U.S. and its allies to agree on strategic plans and goals at the outset of a conflict. As a war continues, participants tend to become more committed to their vision, and coming to an agreement becomes more difficult.
- The U.S. tends to have more influence and leverage at the beginning of allies' conflicts than later on. Rand notes that this extends to adversaries, who are also more likely to be open to U.S. influence early in a conflict.
- The U.S. should set up a committee of its diplomats to review security assistance within a framework that includes humanitarian concerns and compliance with the laws of armed conflict.
- The U.S. should be aware that allies will try to garner support beyond the executive branch, including direct appeals to Congress. At times, this support has affected the U.S. approach to partners' conflicts, particularly when the White House doesn't recognize that it has significant leverage over allies, even when they have different priorities.
- The U.S. should ensure that communications with allies are consistent. Especially in the Ukraine-Russia war, different parts of the U.S. government were conveying disparate messages; the U.S. military voices full support for Ukraine's efforts against Russia, while other parts of the U.S. government took a more tentative tone. These mixed messages made it difficult for the Ukrainian government to know who to listen to.
- In the same vein, the U.S. should realize that in wartime, allies' governments are likely to be fragmented and siloed. The U.S. should work to ensure that key messages are heard by allies' key leaders, as well as across allies' often-complex and siloed bureaucracies.
Overall, Rand says, U.S. policymakers should remember that avoiding conflict in the first place, while not always possible or preferable, is often the best course: wars are almost always easier to enter into than they are to exit.
