Venezuela Strike: U.S. Aims to Reassert Latin Dominance

After an early-morning attack by U.S. forces on January 3 led to the arrest of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, UC Berkeley Latin America scholar Dorothy Kronick says the operation could have far-reaching and unpredictable repercussions.

In an interview, Kronick saw an unlikely but not impossible best-case scenario in which political freedoms are expanded, Venezuela's oil-production capacity is rebuilt and the nation's impoverished people benefit from economic renewal and growth. But she envisioned possible worst-case scenarios, too, with authoritarian repression continuing under U.S. oversight.

Kronick, an associate professor at the UC Berkeley Goldman School of Public Policy, has emerged as a leading expert on the politics of modern Venezuela, with a recent article on how Maduro stole Venezuela's presidential election and commentary featured in the New York Times, the Washington Post and other news outlets. More broadly, her research is focused on contemporary Latin American politics, policing and democratic backsliding.

In written answers to questions from UC Berkeley News, Kronick explored what the future might hold for Venezuela under the oversight of the United States government. Much will depend, she said, on the priorities set - and the pressures applied - by U.S. leaders.

UC Berkeley News: Initially, the White House alluded to Maduro's indictment on drug charges as a motive for the attack and arrest. Later, President Donald Trump mentioned Venezuela's oil. Others have mentioned the country's stores of valuable minerals. What is your sense of Trump's motives for intervention in Venezuela?

Dorothy Kronick: It's all of the above. A flashy photo-op and mission-accomplished moment. A trophy to bring home to South Florida, where many Venezuelans and Cubans are celebrating Maduro's exit. Headlines trumpeting a tough stance on drug trafficking. Getting a better oil deal than Maduro would have countenanced. A credible threat of military force that gives Trump new leverage over Maduro's successor. Also, reportedly, paving a path to domestic militarization here in the United States, a point that Trump reiterated in his press conference on Saturday (Jan. 3, 2026).

And, perhaps most substantively, a strong signal that the president is serious about reasserting U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere.

Has Venezuela been a major player in supplying illegal drugs to the U.S. and Europe?

Contrary to the White House's recent statement that Maduro was a "kingpin flooding America with deadly fentanyl," Venezuela is not a significant source of fentanyl. It does provide an important transit route for cocaine, mostly heading to Europe but also some shipments bound for the United States, and has for decades.

Does cocaine transshipment through Venezuela make U.S. strikes legal self-defense under international law? Various legal analysts have said it does not.

What's your view of how this invasion is playing out among Venezuelans themselves? Will significant elements of the population welcome the invasion?

Soon after Trump announced Maduro's arrest, a Venezuelan friend who is not involved in politics sent me a text message saying "we're free! [whiskey cheers emoji]," followed hours later by "but they're leaving Delcy in charge, it's the same government [heartbreak emoji]." I wouldn't be surprised if those messages reflect a general pattern: optimism at the news of Maduro's exit, and then disappointment after Trump's press conference, when he revealed plans to partner with Maduro's Vice President Delcy Rodríguez.

There haven't been any polls since Saturday, but last November Venezuela's top pollster found that 23% of Venezuelans supported foreign military intervention and 55% opposed it - even as the vast majority of Venezuelans opposed Maduro himself.

Do you envision a possibility that Venezuelans will coalesce to resist the American incursion? How likely is it that they would put up an armed or violent resistance?

If the Chavista leadership remains unified and willing to work with Washington, as early signs suggest, I view this outcome as unlikely. The armed forces and nonstate armed groups are likely to fall in line behind Rodríguez and her ministers.

How will this invasion be seen in the rest of Latin America?

The reaction so far has broken along partisan lines. The governments of Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Colombia, and Uruguay (and Spain) put out a joint statement condemning the intervention. The more right-wing presidents of Argentina, Ecuador, and El Salvador expressed support.

My sense is that many people are caught between horror at the return of U.S. military intervention and a flicker of cautious optimism that maybe, just maybe, life could improve for Venezuelans in the medium term.

Let's think about the range of future possibilities: What's the best-case scenario? How likely is it that the U.S. action will lead to a more democratic Venezuela that's more prosperous for its people? What's the worst-case scenario? Which do you think is more likely?

The best-case scenario is that U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio uses his new leverage not only to revive the Venezuelan economy and rebuild the oil sector, as he and Trump have promised, but also to implement gradual institutional reform that could foster redemocratization: guaranteeing opposition seats on the Supreme Court, on the Electoral Council, and in the cabinet; removing bans on opposition candidates; releasing political prisoners and curbing repression; and revising or rewriting the constitution to lower the stakes of power, for example. All of that would set the stage for free and fair elections.

So far neither Trump nor Rubio has emphasized any of these goals, though some political prisoners have been released. But I hold out hope that the same South Florida political pressures that partly motivated Maduro's arrest could potentially lead Rubio toward institutional reform, too.

One worst-case scenario is that a fracture in the Chavista leadership leads to large-scale violence. At this writing that doesn't appear imminent. Another violent possibility is cyclical breakdown of the U.S.-Venezuela modus vivendi, in which the United States periodically uses military force to induce compliance from Caracas.

Perhaps a more likely scenario is that the new oil and trade deals with Washington bring some measure of economic recovery, allowing Delcy Rodríguez and her associates to further consolidate the authoritarian Chavista regime. That might improve standards of living but would not restore Venezuelans' long-lost political rights.

This interview has been lightly edited for length and clarity.