Geneva – The Israeli army's internal investigations announced on 19 August into five incidents, which led to the deaths of 35 people, including children and humanitarian and medical workers, continue a well-known pattern of Israel denying or misleading the public about such events. This pattern causes investigations to be delayed for months or years, ultimately acknowledging only what can no longer be denied and limiting responsibility to operational errors.
This frequently results in cases being closed or only superficial disciplinary actions being implemented. It turns internal investigations from a means of uncovering the truth and holding perpetrators accountable into a legal shield that hinders the prosecution of soldiers and commanders, reinforcing impunity.
The findings covered five incidents: a World Central Kitchen convoy targeted on 1 April 2024, resulting in the deaths of seven staff members; the killing of child Hind Rajab, six family members, and two Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS) paramedics on 29 January 2024; the killing of 15 people, including eight PRCS workers, six Civil Defence personnel, and a UN employee, in Tel al Sultan, Rafah, on 23 March 2025; a shelling of an Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) shelter in Al-Mawasi on 20 February 2024, which resulted in two women's deaths; and the shooting at an MSF convoy on 18 November 2023, which killed two passengers.
The army's published materials, released 17 to 33 months after the incidents amid international human rights and media pressure, do not represent complete criminal investigations
The Israeli statement indicates that the Military Police Criminal Investigation Division (MPCID) will launch two criminal probes: one focusing on the Hind Rajab incident, with the army citing only alleged coordination failures regarding the ambulance's movement as the reason for this inquiry. A second probe will examine the shooting of Civil Defence rescue workers in Tel al Sultan, whereas the investigations into the other three incidents were dismissed.
The army's published materials, released 17 to 33 months after the incidents amid international human rights and media pressure, do not represent complete criminal investigations. Instead, they are summaries from a factual review carried out by a mechanism within the General Staff. These findings were subsequently sent to the Military Advocate General (MAG Corps) to determine whether to initiate a criminal inquiry, which the MPCID would then conduct. Thus, the process announced so far, from factual examination to referral decision and investigation, has remained within the army.
Although detaching members of the examination mechanism from the direct chain of command grants them some independence from the involved units, it does not remove the mechanism's institutional connection to the army. Additionally, the published findings do not allow us to gauge its true independence in practice, especially when responsibility might reach senior commanders or influence operational policies. Furthermore, the findings, particularly in the three closed cases, do not reveal the factual and legal foundations of the decisions or explain how the examination process was conducted in each instance.
The legal issue extends beyond the military status of the investigating body to whether it upholds the standards of independence, impartiality, promptness, comprehensiveness, effectiveness, credibility, and transparency. These benchmarks are set by the UN Human Rights Committee and the Minnesota Protocol regarding the investigation of potential unlawful killings.
Responsibility should be assigned to individuals and command levels, rather than relying solely on administrative or disciplinary actions. When evidence suggests a possible unlawful killing, criminal investigation should be standard practice. According to the army's own definition, the General Staff examination mechanism functions as a body for factual review and information collection, including questioning relevant commanders before presenting findings to the MAG Corps. While it can serve as an initial step in an investigation, it cannot, on its own, fulfil the investigation duty or justify closing a case without providing the factual and legal basis needed to evaluate the decision's validity.
The five incidents are part of a larger pattern of the Israeli ongoing genocide against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. Since 7 October 2023, Israeli attacks have resulted in over 73,400 Palestinian deaths and more than 174,000 injuries. About 8,000 individuals are still missing beneath the rubble, and roughly 82 per cent of Gaza's infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed. This requires an independent, thorough, and effective international investigation to trace policies, orders, and chains of command. It should establish individual and command responsibility for using this pattern of crimes to pursue the genocidal goal of destroying Palestinians in the Strip, either in whole or in part, as a crucial part of the Palestinian national group.
Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor independently examined each incident, comparing field reports, visual and audio materials, statements from humanitarian organisations and technical investigations with Israeli accounts. The review revealed that the army did not resolve key contradictions between its narrative and the evidence, offering no verifiable facts or legal grounds for closing three cases or clarifying the scope of the two investigations. The review findings are as follows:
World Central Kitchen convoy: Acknowledgement of serious failures and refusal to open a criminal investigation
The Israeli army stated that the deaths of seven World Central Kitchen (WCK) employees on 1 April 2024 were due to its forces believing Hamas members had seized control of the convoy. This belief was based on several factors: spotting an armed individual on top of one of the aid trucks, observing vehicles moving suspiciously around it, the presence of armed guards allegedly hired by the organisation's employees without army coordination, and the convoy deviating from its planned route after unloading. Although the army admitted there were "serious failures" in the operation that contributed to the mistaken belief that Hamas was involved with the vehicles, it concluded that the decisions made by the commanders did not constitute reasonable suspicion of a criminal act.
The army did not sufficiently clarify how its recent findings align with the conclusions from its initial investigation, announced on 5 April 2024. That investigation labelled the three strikes as a "serious violation" of military orders and procedures, leading to the removal of two officers and reprimands for three commanders.
In its 19 August 2026 decision, the army ruled out any reasonable suspicion that would justify a criminal investigation, citing only a "sequence of suspicious indicators" and the "overall operational circumstances," without releasing the analysis used to dismiss criminal suspicion. The acknowledged violations, along with the repeated targeting of three vehicles despite prior coordination and the vehicles bearing the WCK's markings, justify initiating a criminal investigation. This investigation should focus on the reasons behind each strike and the accountability of the commanders and personnel involved, rather than concluding that no criminal responsibility exists and closing the case after a factual review.
WCK emphasised that its team was unarmed and posed no threat, noting that the army had been informed beforehand about its personnel's movements, identities, and activities. It also pointed out that during multiple strikes, vehicles bearing the organisation's logo were clearly visible. WCK argued that the military's conclusions conflated facts and timelines, confusing the sequence of events and blaming the victims for what it called the army's unlawful actions. The organisation reiterated its call for an independent investigation, highlighting the conflict of interest that prevents the army from credibly examining the conduct of its own forces.
Even if the Israeli army's reports about spotting an armed individual, the presence of armed guards, and the vehicles' deviation from the planned route are accurate, this does not justify targeting all convoy members or treating their vehicles as military targets, nor does it strip them of their civilian status. Three separate strikes were carried out, with survivors transferring from the first damaged vehicle to the second, then the third. Each strike was a new decision to attack under altered conditions, requiring another verification of the individuals and vehicles before each strike rather than assuming the initial suspicion applied to the entire convoy.
These facts necessitated a criminal investigation into surveillance recordings, targeting data, communications, and orders, which aims to determine what information was accessible to those requesting, authorising, or executing the strikes, and to understand why the attack persisted after the first vehicle was hit and survivors evacuated. Therefore, dismissing criminal suspicion and closing the case based solely on a factual review does not fulfil the criteria of a thorough and effective investigation.
Hind Rajab: Delayed admission of gunfire and an investigation with no stated scope
For the first time, the Israeli army confirmed it fired on the Hamada family's car on 29 January 2024, resulting in five deaths. Hind Rajab and her cousin Layan survived the initial shooting. The army acknowledged that the two girls later spoke with rescue personnel before Hind was left alone on the call. They also confirmed that a PRCS ambulance's movement to reach them was coordinated. Regarding the shell that hit the ambulance and killed paramedics Youssef Zeno and Ahmed Al-Madhoun, the Israeli statement called it an "allegation" rather than confirmed by investigation, despite both men being found dead inside the ambulance about 50 meters from the family's car on 10 February 2024.
The army linked the opening of the criminal investigation to "alleged failures" in coordinating the ambulance's movement but did not specify whether it would examine the shooting at the family car, the gunfire that killed Layan, the circumstances of Hind's death, or the shell that hit the ambulance after its arrival had been coordinated. Even if it were proven that a civilian vehicle approached the forces or moved against the declared evacuation direction, this would not automatically make it a military target or strip protection from its occupants. Satellite imagery also indicated that the road south was blocked by rubble that morning.
The army had previously claimed that its forces were not close to the vehicle or within firing range, but evidence contradicts this. An investigation by Forensic Architecture, Earshot, and Fault Lines documented 335 bullet holes on the body of the family car and analysed 64 shots heard over six seconds in the recording that ended with Layan's killing. It strongly concluded that Israeli forces fired the shots from a distance of 13 to 23 metres, a range that would have allowed them to see the vehicle and its occupants. It also inferred that the ambulance was probably hit by ammunition from an Israeli tank, based on the impact's direction, the size of the bullet holes, the presence of a fragment from a 120 mm shell nearby, and the alignment of the firing direction with the positions of Israeli tanks visible in satellite images.
On 19 July 2024, independent UN experts warned that the killings of Hind, her family and the paramedics may amount to a war crime, and that failing to conduct a proper investigation and identify those responsible could itself constitute a violation of the right to life. Accordingly, the criminal investigation must cover the shooting that killed five family members, the subsequent gunfire that killed Layan, the cause and timing of Hind's death, and the targeting of the ambulance after its arrival had been coordinated. It must establish what the forces and commanders knew before each shooting and who ordered, authorised and carried it out, rather than reducing the incident to administrative failures concerning the ambulance's movement.
Tel al Sultan: Visual and technical evidence refutes the operational account
The Israeli army confirmed that in three successive incidents, its forces fired at vehicles later identified as a fire engine, ambulances, and a UN vehicle, resulting in the death of 15 Palestinians: eight PRCS personnel, six Civil Defence workers, and one UNRWA employee. It stated that forces had laid an ambush for Hamas members, with six of those killed being part of the movement. The military also confirmed that soldiers crushed the vehicles and covered the bodies with wire mesh. This time, the army determined that the shooting raises suspicion of a criminal offence and decided to launch an investigation with the MPCID.
Visual evidence refutes the Israeli army's initial claim that the vehicles approached without lights or emergency signals. A recording found on the phone of paramedic Rifat Radwan showed emergency vehicles with visible markings and warning lights before the shooting. A military official later admitted that the initial account was inaccurate.
A technical investigation issued by Forensic Architecture and Earshot on 23 February 2026, based on three recordings, audio and spatial analysis, satellite imagery, testimony from two survivors and autopsy reports, documented at least 910 shots, including 844 fired over five and a half minutes. It concluded that 93 per cent of the gunfire during that period was directed at emergency vehicles and personnel, and that soldiers advanced towards them while firing before shooting some of them from close range, with no evidence of an exchange of fire or a tangible threat to the forces at the scene.
The claim that six of the victims were members of Hamas was broad, lacking details about their specific affiliation or supporting evidence. The Israeli investigation report from 20 April 2025 clarified that their identification was confirmed during a later review of the attack. Moreover, having political or administrative ties alone does not make a civilian a valid military target. It must be proven that the individual was engaged in ongoing combat activities within an organised armed group or was directly involved in hostilities at the time of the attack.
Medical personnel and transport units are granted special protection that remains valid regardless of their administrative affiliation. This protection ceases only if they are used for purposes other than their humanitarian role, especially if used to commit acts harmful to the enemy, with warning given when applicable. Additionally, any information not accessible to the involved forces at the time of the incident cannot be used later to justify the attack, nor can that information be applied broadly to an entire medical or humanitarian convoy.
Euro-Med Monitor's preliminary review shows the army justified retrieving and covering bodies and moving vehicles to preserve evidence and clear the road for civilian evacuation. At the same time, they admitted that crushing the vehicles was a mistake. The technical investigation, however, found that bodies were buried, at least one phone was buried, vehicles were crushed and partially buried, and the scene was altered with engineering machinery in the hours after the attack.
The criminal investigation should analyse each of the three shootings individually, reviewing the information available to authorities before each incident, what aerial surveillance revealed, and whether the unit was aware that the road was heavily used by ambulances. It should also investigate why the emergency lights and markings were not recognised, verify the accuracy and timing of the claim that six victims were Hamas members, and determine if any weapons were recovered or if they fired shots. Additionally, the investigation must consider the shooters' positions, the weapons involved, each victim's cause of death, whether wounded individuals were shot again, why the attack lasted over two hours, and why medical assistance was delayed. Finally, it should identify the responsibilities of all those who ordered, authorised, or executed the shootings.
The destruction of vehicles, burial of bodies, and damage to the scene suggest an attempt to conceal or tamper with evidence. This warrants an investigation into orders to move and crush the vehicles, delays in allowing recovery teams access, confiscation and burial of phones, treatment of survivors, and the 37-day detention without charges of Asaad Al-Nassasrah. Additionally, it is important to examine why an incomplete and inaccurate field report was submitted, and who drafted and approved the military accounts, rather than treating the alteration of the crime scene as a simple operational detail.
Médecins Sans Frontières shelter: Assuming a threat instead of verifying the target
The Israeli army stated that on 20 February 2024, its forces fired a shell into a window of a building in Al-Mawasi, Khan Yunis, resulting in the death of an MSF employee's wife and his son's wife, and injuring seven additional people.
The attack was justified by claiming that the building's position at a high point overlooking a route used by Israeli forces near Hamas combat compounds could have allowed occupants to monitor or attack their movements through the window. However, the building's lights were off, and no activity was seen inside or nearby.
The army said the unit lacked the most recent information about the building's connection to MSF and did not see the organisation's logo on the façade, as it was moving behind the building.
MSF confirmed that 64 of its employees and family members were in the building, that Israeli forces had been informed of its location beforehand, and that a 2x3 metre MSF flag was mounted on its façade. The army acknowledged it did not have updated information, raising questions about how humanitarian site data was updated, communicated to forces, and how coordinates were verified before the attack. This failure within its own information system does not eliminate responsibility. Military findings also do not address the organisation's claim that, besides the shell, bullets hit the building's gate, façade, and ground floor.
The military findings do not confirm a military target and instead rely on assumptions rather than concrete evidence. Since the building was elevated, overlooked the forces' route, and one window could have been used for observation or firing, it was considered a threat and was shelled. This reasoning suggests that any high-rise or window overlooking military movements could be targeted without proof that they were actually involved in combat activities.
International humanitarian law prohibits targeting simply because a building might be used for military goals. Instead, it must be shown that the building significantly contributes to military operations based on its nature, location, purpose, or use, and that destroying or neutralising it would provide a clear military benefit given the specific situation at the time.
The army did not report any fighters, weapons, surveillance, or gunfire from the building. Instead, it based its claim on the building's lights being off and no visible movement inside or nearby, suggesting no signs of military activity. By interpreting this lack of evidence as proof, the army transformed absence into evidence, using uncertainty that should have prompted additional verification as a reason to fire the shell.
Closing the case under the assumption that soldiers correctly identified the building as a military target relies on an assessment that itself required investigation. The military purpose behind the firing does not, by itself, justify the legality of the target. The evidence and rationale behind the decision must be scrutinised. Consequently, a criminal investigation should have been initiated to determine what information the forces possessed, how the threat assessment was made, who authorised the firing, what verification and safety steps were taken, why information about humanitarian sites was not received by the unit, and the details surrounding the additional gunfire recorded by the organisation.
Nevertheless, the MAG Corps rejected opening a criminal investigation and instead instructed the relevant commanders to assess the need for unspecified command measures in response to the "deficiencies" identified by the examination.
Médecins Sans Frontières convoy: Justifying civilian deaths with "ricocheting warning shots"
On 18 November 2023, an MSF evacuation convoy with five vehicles, visibly marked with the organisation's logo and carrying 137 people, including 65 children, was hit by Israeli fire while returning to Gaza City. One family member of an MSF employee, a volunteer supporting medical teams at Al-Shifa Hospital, was killed. Another individual was injured and succumbed to his wounds four days later.
The Israeli army stated that while the convoy had received final approval to head south, this approval had not yet reached the soldiers at the checkpoint. Consequently, the convoy was halted and waited before returning to Gaza City due to concerns about nightfall. The army explained that the return trip was not coordinated and that travelling against evacuation directions appeared suspicious. They reported that various forces fired warning shots and then fired toward the road about 100 meters in front of the convoy, suggesting the two casualties may have been caused by ricochets or shrapnel, rather than direct gunfire at the vehicles.
This statement attributes the consequences of a failure within the army to the convoy's passengers. The fact that the approval did not reach the checkpoint does not cancel the approval nor strip the convoy of protection, and travelling in an uncoordinated direction does not turn 137 civilians into military targets. The statement omits any mention of armed individuals or hostile acts by the convoy's passengers. Instead, it considers the direction of travel alone as enough to assume a threat and justify gunfire. Even if the forces aimed to warn the convoy or stop it from advancing, calling the shots "warning shots" does not exempt them from responsibility for where they were aimed, the firing distance, or the risk of ricochet against crowded civilian vehicles.
Survivor testimonies collected by MSF oppose this conclusion. One survivor described seeing tanks and snipers targeting the convoy, especially the fourth and fifth vehicles, and then opening fire. He mentioned being grazed on the forehead by a bullet before it hit his colleague sitting next to him in the head. The army failed to clarify how gunfire, reportedly aimed at the road about 100 meters ahead of the convoy, could mortally wound passengers in the rear vehicles. Additionally, it did not release ballistics reports or analysis of bullet paths and vehicle damage that could clarify this inconsistency.
The Israeli army's admission that its fire might have resulted in the two deaths, along with direct testimony suggesting the vehicles were targeted, raises reasonable suspicion. This warrants a criminal investigation into the units' positions, weapons employed, firing orders, communication records, firing distances and directions, as well as injuries and damage to each vehicle.
The investigation should have also included MSF documentation, which, two days later, showed an Israeli bulldozer and military vehicles destroying five of its vehicles, despite their potential value as physical evidence. Accepting the idea of "ricocheting bullets" without any technical evidence, then dismissing direct fire and closing the case, does not determine the cause of the deaths. Instead, it replaces a proper criminal investigation with a speculative explanation that shields those responsible from accountability.
These five decisions reflect a historical pattern where Israel transforms suspected crimes into prolonged military investigations, fragments incidents, depends on unit reports, and limits accountability to lower operational levels, avoiding addressing the criminal responsibility of commanders and policymakers.
The Israeli army stated that the General Staff reviewed approximately 150 incidents since the start of the war and sent its findings to the MAG Corps. However, it did not release a list of these incidents, details on how long each review took, their outcomes, how many were referred for criminal investigation, or how many led to indictments. This lack of information impedes assessing the mechanism's effectiveness or understanding whether the decisions announced are isolated cases or part of an institutional approach that attributes responsibility solely to "operational errors" and dismisses their criminal nature.
The earlier record supports this pattern. An army update on the 2014 Gaza Strip attack shows that approximately 500 complaints and reports were received regarding about 360 incidents. Of these, roughly 220 incidents were referred for review, with about 160 closed without a criminal investigation. Even in the 2018 update, the only convictions announced involved three soldiers in a looting case, and no convictions were announced for civilian deaths or targeting decisions that resulted in significant casualties.
These procedures do not alter the fundamental jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. The principle of complementarity in Article 17 of the Rome Statute relates to whether a specific case can be accepted by the Court. A case is considered inadmissible only if national authorities are actively investigating or prosecuting the same individual for essentially the same conduct, or if they have previously examined the conduct and chose not to prosecute, for reasons that are not due to their unwillingness or inability to conduct genuine proceedings.
A factual review that does not aim to determine criminal responsibility falls short of this standard. Similarly, an investigation focused only on coordination failures or the actions of field personnel does not satisfy the requirement when the case before the Court concerns the accountability of commanders, policies, or crimes not addressed by the national investigation. Even when procedures relate to the same individual and same conduct, the Court still bears the responsibility of evaluating their authenticity. This includes determining whether they aimed to protect the person from prosecution, whether unjustified delay indicated a lack of genuine intent to prosecute, or whether they lacked independence or impartiality and were conducted in a way that contradicted that intent. Therefore, Israel cannot rely solely on these limited examinations and investigations to prevent the Court from investigating individuals or crimes that are not covered by genuine national proceedings.
The international community should not view the announced military examination results as independent investigations or proof that accountability has been established. They should also avoid using these findings to hinder international investigations or to argue that complementarity prevents the International Criminal Court from acting.
The UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry and other relevant international investigative bodies should be granted unrestricted access to Gaza and Israel. This access is necessary to inspect sites, gather evidence, interview witnesses and officials, and conduct a thorough investigation into the five incidents and the wider pattern of targeting civilians and humanitarian and medical personnel. The investigation must examine individual and command accountability, as well as the policies and orders guiding targeting operations. It should not be limited to merely reviewing field-level mistakes.
The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court should examine the five incidents as part of the investigation into the Situation in the State of Palestine as potential war crimes and crimes against humanity, and expand the investigation to include the crime of genocide. This should involve examining how Palestinians, along with humanitarian and medical workers, facilities, and vehicles, are targeted in ways that undermine their survival means. This includes looking at the broader pattern of killings, serious harm, and destructive living conditions. It also involves assessing whether these acts were carried out with the intent to destroy Palestinians in Gaza, either entirely or partially, as part of the Palestinian national group.
Euro-Med Monitor calls on the ICC Prosecutor to pursue all individuals with sufficient evidence of responsibility, including those who issued orders and commanders meeting command responsibility criteria. Israeli investigations or the opening of two inquiries should not automatically lead to suspending or limiting the international investigation unless it is proven that the national proceedings involve the same individuals and significantly the same conduct.
All states must cooperate fully with the International Criminal Court, implement its warrants, protect its independence from pressure and sanctions, and exercise their national jurisdiction, including universal jurisdiction, to investigate crimes and prosecute suspects on their territory. Euro-Med Monitor urges states to halt the transfer of weapons, ammunition, components, technology, intelligence, and maintenance services to Israel if there is a clear risk they could be used to commit or facilitate international crimes. It also warns against considering the army's unpublished findings as evidence that accountability has been achieved.
