
Edgar Franco-Vivanco is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Michigan. His research examines how colonial-era institutions and contemporary criminal violence contribute to economic underperformance, particularly in Latin America.
Franco-Vivanco discusses Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum's proposed constitutional amendment requiring candidates for the presidency, state governorships and head of government of Mexico City to hold only Mexican citizenship. He examines the concerns behind the proposal, current Latin American presidents who hold foreign citizenship and the case of former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, whose Japanese citizenship shielded him from extradition for nearly five years.
What is the reasoning behind Mexico's proposed restrictions on dual-national candidates?
Recently, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum proposed a constitutional amendment that would require candidates for the presidency, state governorships and the Head of Government of Mexico City to hold only Mexican nationality. Individuals with dual nationality would have to renounce their other citizenship before registering as candidates.
The administration argues that the reform resolves an ambiguity in the existing Constitution, which already requires holders of these offices to be Mexican by birth but does not clearly address individuals who already possess another nationality.
Sheinbaum has emphasized concerns about potential conflicts of interest. These concerns are not entirely hypothetical. Two sitting Latin American presidents possess U.S. citizenship. Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa, who was born in Miami, holds both Ecuadorian and U.S. nationality. Colombia's recently elected president, Abelardo de la Espriella, is a naturalized U.S. citizen and holds Italian nationality. Both have cultivated close relations with the Trump administration. De la Espriella, in particular, is a vocal Trump supporter and has been registered as a Republican in the United States.
There are also historical reasons to take potential conflicts seriously. After the collapse of his government in 2000, former Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori went to Japan, whose government recognized him as a Japanese citizen. Japan declined Peru's extradition request because Japanese law prohibited the extradition of its nationals and the two countries lacked an extradition treaty. Fujimori consequently remained beyond the reach of Peruvian courts while living in Japan for approximately five years.
Sheinbaum has also explicitly invoked former Tamaulipas governor Francisco García Cabeza de Vaca as a justification for the reform. The Mexican government has identified Cabeza de Vaca as a dual Mexican-American citizen. He currently resides in Texas and faces an outstanding Mexican arrest warrant related to alleged organized crime and money laundering offenses, which he denies. He has also expressed interest in running for president in 2030.
What are the political and institutional implications of the proposed restrictions?
These examples show that a second nationality can sometimes provide access to foreign legal protections and that competing national obligations can constitute legitimate institutional concerns. Yet the timing and design of the reform raise a different question: whether a genuine problem is also being used to alter the pool of eligible political competitors.
This matters particularly in Mexico because dual nationality was deliberately institutionalized in the 1990s to preserve the rights and ties of the country's enormous population abroad. The central question, therefore, is not whether dual nationality can create conflicts of interest-to be clear, it can-but whether those risks justify restricting the political rights of an entire category of Mexican citizens.
From a political survival perspective, the reform also changes the incentives of political competition. Eligibility rules determine who can challenge incumbents. Although this reform would have little direct effect on the vast majority of citizens, it could help the current governing coalition deter or exclude some potential competitors. More concerning, however, is the precedent it may establish: Restrictions on who can run for office can be broadened in the future. This reform illustrates how legal and constitutional changes can address a genuine institutional problem while also creating political advantages for those already in power.